Does Albania Have a Foreign Policy? - Ditmir Bushati, May 2026

History shows us that once an order is established, it tends to endure for a certain period. After the First World War, the order lasted two decades. The order established after the Second World War lasted four decades. Meanwhile, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, political scientists such as Francis Fukuyama argued about the “end of history” and the embrace of liberal democracy as the final form of governance. Three decades after the end of the Cold War, we are now witnessing the end of the “end of history.” A new world order is taking shape.

Even if the consequences are not yet felt everywhere, the disintegration of the world order is already a bitter reality. And this is precisely where the danger lies, because the effects initially appear slowly and then escalate with increasing speed. Rivalry over energy, technology, food supply chains, industry, and finance has intensified. Anyone expecting a quick return to normality is wasting precious time. The situation we are facing resembles a tsunami whose waves are not immediately visible.

Nevertheless, this transitional period has several defining characteristics. The first is the fracture within the West and the rupture of transatlantic alliance. The West remains a valid normative ideal, but at present it no longer exists as a coherent political reality. The American pole remains powerful, although with more limited influence than during the two decades that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The second characteristic is China’s emergence as a guardian of the world order, possessing the greatest potential to challenge American dominance. The differences between China and the United States are not merely political, military, and ideological, but extend across numerous fields, from technology to major international plans and projects.

Alongside the characteristics of the early years of the 21st century, such as the existence of a single pole, and those of the 20th century, such as competition between two superpowers, today we can also distinguish a third characteristic reminiscent of the 19th century: a partial understanding among major powers to silently tolerate violations of international law.

No matter how small or insignificant a state may be in the international arena, it needs a strategy in foreign policy. This is even more necessary in times of transition. Three pillars shape the character of foreign policy: values, interests, and power. These three elements are essential when the balance and dynamics of the world order are shifting.

In our case, only the first two are truly relevant, since power is a luxury reserved for big players. They are able to project military and economic power, forcing smaller actors to align themselves with their objectives. Meanwhile, alliances, partnerships, and smart diplomacy are what allow smaller states to exert influence beyond the size of their economies or militaries.

For Albania, one of the key challenges in foreign policy is preserving coherence and consistency in relation to the values we defend and the interests we pursue, while at the same time maintaining alliances with strategic partners. This becomes a necessity, especially in uncertain times when points of reference are constantly shifting. While our interests and aspirations constitute the horizon of foreign policy, values — and consistency in upholding them — should define its boundaries.

The transatlantic rupture is not a good omen for Albania and our region, where since the fall of the Iron Curtain the United States has been viewed as the enforcer of security perimeter, whereas Europeans have often been perceived as “allergic” to the use of force. It is a well-known fact that the European Union is a project whose origins lie in American support after the end of the Second World War. However, today, disagreements between the United States and the EU are greater than ever. The U.S. National Security Strategy reflects this reality, with the EU described as contributing to the “erasure of European civilization.”

The shape of the new world order and the position the transatlantic alliance will occupy within it will be determined in the not-too-distant future. States such as Albania are neither key players nor mere spectators in this equation. Uncertainty is an inherent part of international relations, especially during transitions from one era to another. What matters is understanding why change is taking place and how to respond to it. Acting on the basis of values and interests will create the necessary space for us to navigate this new era of international relations. Our relationship with the United States is irreplaceable. Equally important, however, is ensuring that we do not squander the opportunity for EU membership, created by the current geopolitical situation.

The simultaneous wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, accompanied by fractures within the transatlantic alliance, have exposed a chameleon-like dimension in our foreign policy. I do not know how valuable proposals to engage in dialogue with Putin are, given that it was precisely we — as co-penholders with the United States in the UN Security Council on issues related to Ukraine — who stood out for our critical stance, beyond diplomatic language, against Russian aggression in Ukraine. What impact could such a proposal have on our region and on the resolution of statehood-related conflicts? How serious is this proposal when the positions of key European leaders — who until yesterday were criticized for their soft approach toward Russia — now emphasize the need to build a European security architecture against Russian aggression?

Likewise, the need to differentiate ourselves from other European countries regarding Albania’s presence on the Board of Peace is unproductive. We are where we belong, alongside the United States, whenever our contribution is considered valuable. Although in a different format, time, and geopolitical context, we were also part of the U.S.-led coalition in the Iraq War, although many European allies hesitated or criticized it.

The unsolicited proposal to conduct military operations against Iran from Albanian territory, in the absence of American military bases, raises questions about the credibility of such a proposal. It may also be interpreted as a challenge to European allies, who, despite hosting American military bases, have not responded to calls from the U.S. president.

What interest do such proposals serve? I raise this question because interests guide the choices states make, and this is entirely legitimate. Our interest is to stand alongside the United States, but we must also possess the weight we currently lack in order to undertake such commitments.

Likewise, it is safe to say that the outcome of American-Chinese competition will not be decided in Albania. Therefore, we should avoid any rhetoric that frames these two actors in opposition through the prism of Albanian realities.

In foreign policy, consistency is an essential component of credibility. Let me be clear: Albania is a small state that cannot resolve complex international issues on its own. But acting seriously and demonstrating strategic clarity is our obligation. Such issues require balancing the interests and values we have promoted over the years, because what is at stake is the maturity and continuity of the state, as well as its ability to navigate in a constantly changing world.

Equally concerning is the loss of one of the main assets of our foreign policy: leverage and political weight among Albanians in the region. This cannot be restored merely by organizing nationwide gatherings in Tirana.

Personal relationships aimed at sustaining a network fossilized by prolonged time in power, the instrumentalization of national interest for the needs of day-to-day politics, and the meaningless competition — in the absence of cooperation — between Tirana and Pristina for leverage among Albanians in the region, have significantly weakened the political influence of Albanians while also slowing the advancement of the rights they should enjoy.

The concentration of political energy on normalizing relations with Serbia has been accompanied by a weakening of the leading role of the Albanian factor in the region. I have supported and continue to support the normalization of relations between Albania and Serbia. But these relations cannot be built in disregard of history, geography, and the realities of our region.

I have never understood Albania’s position whereby, on the one hand, it publicly asked the EU “not to pressure Serbia to join sanctions against Russia,” while on the other hand it suspended joint governmental meetings with Kosovo because of the restrictive measures that the EU unjustly imposed on Kosovo.

It remains unexplained why the Prime Minister’s positions at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Board of Peace regarding Kosovo’s Specialist Chambers in The Hague, as well as the resolutions and declarations of the Albanian Parliament, do not correspond with the positions and actions of our foreign policy. Albania has repeatedly joined EU statements at the UN Security Council emphasizing the “importance and necessity of supporting the work of Kosovo’s Specialist Chambers,” even though this is not an issue of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, which the EU assesses in the context of candidate countries’ alignment. Whom do these false illusions serve when not only domestic policy is not reflected in foreign policy, but even declarations made in international forums are not translated into foreign policy positions and actions?

The unacceptable language used toward Albanians in North Macedonia is symptomatic of a policy sometimes characterized by paternalism and at other times by indifference, accompanied by a lack of sensitivity toward the sacrifices Albanians have made in order to be treated as equals with Macedonians.

The platform of Albanian political parties in North Macedonia in 2017, supported by Albania, was based on the principle of advancing Albanian rights and equality with Macedonians. This platform produced certain successes precisely because our foreign policy was focused on fulfilling objectives linked to the national interest, rather than to the political fate of particular parties or individuals.

The involvement, without any substantial reason, in a cycle of exchanges with Bulgaria regarding its disputes with North Macedonia is now being reflected in Bulgaria’s demands toward Albania in the enlargement process. We should not be surprised, because states conduct diplomacy according to cold calculations.

History and geography are two components that cannot be changed in foreign policy. No one chooses their neighbors. For this reason, it is essential to make every effort to coexist with them. Albania must have a high-level, long-term strategy for addressing issues with Greece, the most developed neighbor in the Balkans. Such a strategy should be grounded in the country’s values and interests, addressing bilateral issues in their entirety.

Every time the foreign minister changes, it has become customary to speak of a “new beginning” in relations with Greece. The bitter truth is that no step has been taken in this direction since 2018. Albania has mistakenly overestimated the short-term gains while not calculating the long-term losses.

After a multi-year process of discussions and negotiations, in 2018 we were close to a historic compromise with Greece. I call it historic because all unresolved issues between us would have been settled once and for all in a fair manner. Perhaps neither Albania nor Greece was ready for such a compromise at the time. Today, conditions may have matured. Therefore, comprehensive, fair, and sustainable solutions are needed, rather than selectively addressing individual issues.

From this perspective, it would be a mistake to separate the maritime issue from the broader package of unresolved issues with Greece. The foreign minister’s announcement that this issue would be referred to an international court within the year, if done without conditions and prior preparation, risks repeating the mistakes of 2009. For the country to proceed to an international court, hiring foreign law firms is not sufficient. The country must be adequately prepared in relation to international case-law, must have done its “homework,” and must draw conclusions from both the mistakes of 2009 and the achievements of 2018. This is not about transferring responsibility on how the issue is addressed, but rather about expressing the willingness of the parties to accept the verdict of the international court.

In other words, the country must possess the ability to accomplish three tasks: fully understanding the precedents established by the international law of the sea, thoroughly developing alternative solutions in accordance with constitutional jurisprudence, and formulating a strategy for implementing the most suitable of these solutions.

Addressing difficult foreign policy problems requires strategy, time, and patience. This lesson is not about fatalism or avoiding tough choices. It is about what you can accomplish at an acceptable cost to other priorities, both foreign and domestic. Perfect is rarely on the menu in diplomacy, especially today.

To paraphrase Henry Kissinger, the statesman does not enjoy the analyst’s luxury in foreign policy, because problems are imposed upon him, the time available to find the right solution is never sufficient, and a wrong decision is often irreversible. Moreover, the success of decision-making is ultimately subject to the judgment of history.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ditmir Bushati, former Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, former Member of the Albanian Parliament.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation or the organizations the authors work for.