01.04.2026

A Smoke Screen - Ditmir Bushati, April 2026

The enthusiastic promises of concluding the negotiations by 2027 and completing the process of accession to the European Union by 2030 were partly overshadowed by the joint initiative of the Prime Minister of Albania and the President of Serbia, published in the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, calling for the abandonment of accession and the acceptance of a kind of “second-tier” relationship with the EU.

Since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the EU’s enlargement policy has undergone a shift. From Croatia’s accession in 2013 — the EU’s last enlargement — until February 2022, enlargement was a stalled and politically contested process. As a consequence of the war, it is now being regarded as an important instrument of European security.

Viewed in this context, enlargement is increasingly being used not only to prepare countries for accession, from the standpoint of rule-of-law reforms and sustainable economic and social development, but also as an opportunity to strengthen their resilience by geopolitically aligning them with the EU, in a security environment shaped by war on the continent. A war that has already entered its fifth year.

Against this backdrop, the debate has also intensified over whether the enlargement process requires new institutional models in order to be accelerated. Among the proposals put forward are: (i) a process of “gradual admission” or different phases, in which each phase is linked to the fulfilment of specific reforms; (ii) “integration into the EU internal market” as an intermediate and preparatory stage to facilitate accession to the EU; and (iii) “reversed enlargement”, which gives priority to accession before the fulfilment of the criteria, accompanied by corresponding guarantees for meeting them while already being part of the EU.

Such proposals seek to reconcile geopolitical urgency with the existing framework of the EU accession process. Of the above proposals, that of “reversed enlargement” has been rejected by EU member states, which insist on a process combining reforms in the field of the rule of law with geopolitical alignment.

Meanwhile, the initiative of the Prime Minister of Albania and the President of Serbia creates a smoke screen, because it proposes models that have nothing to do with one another: participation in the EU internal market and in the Schengen area, while giving up accession to the EU.

For an issue such as EU membership, which is regarded as a national objective to be achieved after NATO accession, this initiative should first have been subjected to a genuine political and social debate. The government must demonstrate the ability to carry out three tasks: (i) a timely understanding of the problems associated with the different stages of the enlargement process; (ii) an in-depth elaboration of the solutions it proposes, without evading responsibility; and (iii) the transparent formulation of a strategy for implementing what is most useful as a way forward.

We Albanians have no doubts and remain steadfast in our aspiration to join the other peoples within the European family. For that reason, we deserve to be informed of the reasons behind this initiative and to be heard on what we believe should be done in order to make the European path a reality.

Presented to a German audience, which bears the main burden of the EU’s financial costs, the initiative was received coldly by the German political class. The only person to comment on it was the Commissioner for Enlargement, who said that “the proposers have no idea how much work and how many reforms are needed in order to be part of the internal market and the Schengen area.” This is a discouraging statement compared with her earlier position that “Albania’s goal of completing the accession negotiations with the EU by 2027 is an ambitious but achievable objective.” If concluding the negotiations is an achievable objective, there is no reason why participation in the EU internal market — which in any circumstance amounts to less than accession — should not also be an achievable objective for Albania.

Likewise, any suggestion or initiative on the part of the Commissioner aimed at generating a political and democratic process — one entirely absent, though in fact it should have preceded such initiatives in Albania and Serbia — would be appreciated as a sign of the sensitivity of the institution she represents toward the values and principles of democracy, dialogue and political understanding. At the same time, it would signal a return to the best tradition of the European Commission, by showing special care for encouraging and respecting democratic processes in political and social life, rather than merely ticking the boxes of countless plans, matrices and strategies which, in a number of cases, fail to produce measurable effects in the lives of citizens.
 

Misunderstandings about the internal market

Participation in the internal market for non-EU countries means accepting EU rules for the implementation of the free movement of goods, services, capital and people, but without the possibility of financial benefit or the use of instruments that correct inequalities which may arise and which are available only to member states. By contrast, the Schengen area is not an economic package, but a strict regime of trust encompassing security, justice, visa policy and border control.

It is important to know that the European Economic Area was created in 1992 in order to enable countries such as Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein to participate in the EU internal market, even though they did not seek membership, but rather a common market with the EU because of mutual economic and political interest. The above-mentioned countries accepted the EU’s supervisory rules because of the size of the market and its high standards, since the European Economic Area consists of developed economies with consolidated institutions, advanced democracies, security standards and the rule of law. In this way, both EU members and non-members benefit from a larger and more regulated market, where national economies are able to withstand competitive pressures and where consumers enjoy greater choice.

In practice, this means that all businesses and individuals are treated as if they were part of the EU, and may establish themselves and move their businesses freely anywhere, without any barriers, whether tariff or non-tariff. Public procurement rules also support the internal market. The general principles of the market — such as non-discrimination, transparency, equal treatment, mutual recognition and proportionality — also apply to public procurement.

Could the model of Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein be applicable in the case of Albania and Serbia? This could have been an option worth exploring much earlier, in coordination with regional integration initiatives as well. The latter has always been regarded as a precondition for EU accession. Unfortunately, however, it remains either insufficiently used or badly misused.

At the Sofia Summit in 2018, the EU and the Western Balkans committed themselves to the creation of the Western Balkans Regional Common Market, as preparation for integrating our region into the EU internal market. Instead of working to accelerate this complex process, which requires the fulfilment of European standards, the Prime Minister of Albania and the President of Serbia created a parallel project, called Open Balkans, the purpose and results of which remain unclear to this day.

It may sound ironic, but as soon as Albania advanced with the chapter clusters for EU accession, it abandoned Open Balkans. As we await the Report on the Interim Benchmarks and the EU’s common position on the first chapter cluster, which concerns the rule of law and is decisive for the quality and speed with which the accession chapters will be closed, Albania is rejoining Serbia in declaring the abandonment of accession and the acceptance of a kind of “second-tier” relationship with the EU.

Leaving aside the contradictory context above, at first glance, the request to become part of the EU internal market may appear attractive, since people naturally gravitate toward economic benefits everywhere in the world. Albanians and Serbs are no exception in this regard. One need only recall the impact on citizens and businesses of the fall of the “Schengen Wall” and the securing of visa-free travel.

But nothing in the EU comes for free. Especially when it comes to the internal market, which is one of the most sophisticated forms of economic integration known to date. Participation in it is not like taking a walk in the park, but like competing in the Olympic Games, where serious and daily training is required. The internal market functions on a level of trust that allows for the unhindered application of the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. To make this possible, EU member states must believe that we possess not only laws on paper, but also the capacity to implement EU rules and policies.

The EU internal market is not merely about the economy, but above all about the rule of law in the economy. Therefore, integration into the EU internal market is impossible unless the current model of governance changes — a model based on the personalization of power and full control over all institutions, as well as the metastases of corruption and organized crime in critical sectors of the economy.

SPAK’s investigations into tenders in infrastructure and technology, among other things, demonstrate the need to ensure equal competition for all domestic and European businesses by applying public procurement and competition rules. Likewise, policies and actions are needed that create the trust of member states with regard to unblocking EU funds in agriculture and technology, as a result of the alleged violations and investigations undertaken by European and Albanian institutions. In other words, every lek spent from the state budget and every euro coming from the EU budget and subject to procurement must be governed by the same logic.

In short, without the rule of law, democracy and good governance, participation in the EU internal market, growth in productive and export capacity, and the enjoyment of the benefits deriving from such participation cannot even be imagined.

The initiators make it clear that they are not seeking institutional integration into the EU. In other words, they do not regard participation in the internal market as an intermediate stage toward accession to the EU. Austria, Sweden and Finland first became part of the EU internal market and were then admitted to the EU. Iceland, too, which is part of the internal market, has announced that it will hold a referendum in order to consult its citizens on possible EU membership. If the citizens respond positively, Iceland will become the EU’s 28th member state.

Participation in EU institutions is a constituent element of the accession process, and without it accession does not exist. However much the purpose of the initiative may be to open only the door to the EU internal market, while acknowledging the difficulties of opening the EU’s main door, our ambition cannot end there. All the more so since the EU has shown generosity toward Albania, giving us the opportunity to open all chapter clusters at unprecedented speed and expecting from us the fulfilment of the criteria related to closing them for EU accession.

We must not forget that, in the current geopolitical environment, the EU is guided not only by the logic of trade, but also by the logic of security and even by the protection of the integrity of its own market. For that reason, investments are also viewed through the prism of security. This is why the EU has adopted regulations on the screening of foreign direct investment. These elements are also reflected in the accession negotiations process in order to assess who is investing, where investments are being made and who controls key sectors such as energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, data and advanced technologies.
 

The illusion of Schengen

The experience of countries with a past similar to that of Albania and Serbia shows that countries first became part of the EU and only afterwards part of the Schengen area. The opposite of what is proposed in the joint initiative of the Prime Minister of Albania and the President of Serbia, where participation in Schengen is sought without being part of the EU.

The countries that joined the EU in 2004 and then decided to become part of Schengen needed another four years after EU accession to do so. Croatia, which became part of the EU in 2013, needed another ten years to become part of Schengen. Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the EU in 2007, needed a full eighteen years to become part of Schengen. The members of Schengen that are not EU members are Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. Their high standard, incomparable to that of Albania and Serbia, requires no further comment.

The above facts speak for themselves. To become part of Schengen, the requirements are even stricter than those for joining the internal market or acceding to the EU, because full trust is required in the institutions of the state seeking to join, along with an uncompromising fight against corruption and organized crime, full cooperation in the police and judicial fields, and full harmonization with EU policies.

Above all, this cooperation implies acting on European arrest warrants so that the country acceding to Schengen does not become a “safe haven” for individuals or structured criminal groups evading justice. The record of the Albanian police and law-enforcement institutions in executing arrest warrants against structured criminal groups is deeply deficient.

Sensitivity to the repeated demands of international partners for the elimination of organized crime groups remains low. The security structures in general, and the police in particular, suffer from a lack of trust on the part of international partners. No marketing strategy or action plan can replace iron political will in this field. The only currency that matters in this case is trust: trust that a country controls its territory and its security risks, and that its law-enforcement institutions function equally for all.

The work required to become part of the Schengen area is several times more difficult and demanding than meeting the criteria that made possible the lifting of the visa regime with the Schengen area, or meeting the criteria for EU accession. Therefore, let us harbour no illusions. Our road to Schengen will be longer and more difficult than that of participation in the internal market and accession to the EU.
 

The sustainable path

Under such conditions, the question demanding an answer from the very initiators of the proposal is why they are asking the EU for something impossible to obtain, and what the value of this proposal actually is. Why this smoke screen now?

Whatever the reasons behind the initiative, one thing is certain: for Albania, the only sustainable path is full membership of the EU. To sit with dignity at a table where rights and obligations apply equally to all, and not in a secondary relationship with the EU. At the same time, the EU’s reward for reforms in the field of the rule of law and geopolitical alignment remains essential both for the effectiveness of enlargement and for its role in strengthening European security.

EU membership can be achieved through the building of a climate of cooperation and political understanding that encourages the rule of law, guarantees free and fair elections, media freedom, and the rigorous application of European rules across all areas of governance. This objective can be achieved only through sustainable reforms and measurable results. Not through illusions or evasion of political responsibility.

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ditmir Bushati, former Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, former Member of the Albanian Parliament.

 

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation or the organizations the authors work for.

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