Between Conviction and Responsibility - Ditmir Bushati, September 2025

Even though today it may seem utopian to try to answer the question of what the ethical essence of politics is, the answer would not be complete if it were limited only to the contrast between the “ethic of conviction” and the “ethic of responsibility.” According to Weber, the former has to do with moral strength, while the latter is a truly political calling, which demands a genuine commitment to a major cause, accompanied by the exercise of a deep sense of responsibility.

I invoked Weber to better understand the paradoxical situation in which the process of EU enlargement and consolidation finds itself. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, most of Europe’s political elite believes that the enlargement and consolidation of the European project is both necessary and inevitable, but at the same time, impossible.
 

Missed Opportunities

Since that dramatic moment for Europe’s security, three opportunities have been missed.

First, Europeans failed to capitalize on the Ukrainians’ resistance in the East of the continent to resolve the unfinished conflicts of statehood in Southeastern Europe, so they could focus on the long-term confrontation with Russia in the East.

In today’s destructive geopolitical context, the main EU member states chose the shortest route with the Western Balkans, concluding deals driven by obsession with migration (Italy–Albania); access to natural resources (Germany–Serbia); or access to the military industry (France–Serbia). This reinforced the perception that the Western Balkans, although geographically surrounded by the EU, are treated as a periphery where the “big ones” of the EU can solve their own problems.

In terms of security and politics, the Western Balkans are far from being a true region with shared objectives. More than two decades of investment in a policy centered on Serbia, or on its good relations with Albania for the sake of regional stability, did not lead either to its democratization or to Serbia’s alignment with the EU’s common foreign policy.

Even here, the EU again found the shortcut, imposing restrictive measures on Kosovo, although it is well known who incites disorder in the region, and although the Kosovar state is a Euro-Atlantic creation, aligned with the West since day one.

Although Albania has pursued a foreign policy aligned with the West since the fall of communism, strangely enough, it publicly asked the EU “not to put pressure on Serbia to join sanctions against Russia.” At the same time, it did not hesitate to publicly denounce the unjust restrictive measures imposed on Kosovo, even canceling the joint government meeting as a sign of distancing itself from the EU’s stance.

Not even the terrorist attack in Banjska—an aggression instigated by an EU candidate country against a neighboring country seeking EU membership—changed the EU’s pragmatic and short-sighted compass toward the region. Reprimanding statements toward Belgrade were never followed by concrete action.

Therefore, no one should be surprised by what is happening in Serbia today. The reason why the students who have been protesting for a year on Serbia’s streets do not wave the EU flag must be sought in the fact that the EU has preached more than it has fought for the realization of democratic standards and European values in our region. It is no exaggeration to say that with its pursued policy, the EU has lost Serbia, along with its investment: Aleksandar Vučić.

Second, President Biden’s administration did not produce the desired changes in the region. Even though Biden will likely be remembered as the last Atlanticist in the White House, his thesis of dividing the world between democracies and autocracies did not yield results regarding the challenges of democracy and the rule of law in Southeastern Europe. As Ian Bremmer, one of the most prominent American political scientists, told me on my podcast “Public Square”: “The U.S. had that position in 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell. But in 2024, the idea that an American president says that the U.S. will distinguish between democracies and authoritarian regimes is not very credible; it does not reflect reality.”

In our region, elections have lost their significance. What Tocqueville once defined as their “surprise effect”—because of the feverish state into which society enters during an election process and the fact that the result cannot be predicted in advance, nor changed afterward—no longer exists. Unlike most Western countries and those of Central and Eastern Europe, which experienced frequent power changes as they joined the EU, longevity and personalization of power are distinctive traits in the Western Balkans. Even when political rotation has taken place, it has not been accompanied by a transformative agenda and future-oriented outlook.

Similarly, regional economic initiatives, backed by the Biden administration with the principle “let’s first do business and then politics,” did not achieve the expected results nor helped ease disputes or transform former enemies into good neighbors.

Third, Germany under Chancellor Olaf Scholz spoke of “Zeitenwende” (a turning point) and promised in its governing program an “acceleration” of the accession process for the Western Balkans, which did not happen. Until now, every EU enlargement wave has had Germany as a driving force, combined with leading coalitions of member states pushing the process forward.

We should harbor no illusions. Encouraging words from the Enlargement Commissioner regarding negotiation chapters, frontrunner countries, and possible accession dates must match the reality on the ground regarding democracy, rule of law, economy, state de-capture, media freedom, and inclusion of the opposition, civil society, academia, and business as integral parts of the enlargement process. These words must also align with the political commitment of key EU countries and the practice of previous enlargement rounds.

The same approach was followed with the 2018 Enlargement Strategy, where the then-Commissioner for Enlargement declared that: “Serbia and Montenegro, as frontrunner countries, could join the EU in 2025.” Viewed seven years later, I believe that, in any case, words must be backed by concrete actions, otherwise they risk producing a “double pretense” scenario, of which we have often been witnesses: Western Balkan countries pretend to be “reforming” while the EU pretends to be “enlarging.”

The Widening Gap

Although since February 24, 2022, there has been a new geopolitical moment in Europe, enlargement remains a side story—part of a much larger one about Europe’s future, war, relations with other global powers, its strategic autonomy, and its security architecture.

Yes, EU enlargement policy has been revived as a geostrategic necessity after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with the prospect of Ukraine’s and Moldova’s membership, as well as accession talks with Montenegro and Albania, and with the European Commission’s approval of new growth plans and facilitative instruments tailored to the specific profiles of the candidate countries.

But this is not enough! The Economic Growth Plan offers only a small recalibration of the status quo in EU–Western Balkans relations in the new geopolitical context, with limited results, lacking the political ambition and institutional innovation necessary to signal true progress toward EU membership. The Plan’s measures are modest and unlikely to reshape economic relations or change the Western Balkans’ development trajectory toward convergence with the EU average.

Instead, the Plan follows a gradualist logic that adds to an already overcrowded landscape of political tools and financial instruments, in place since the launch of the Stabilization and Association Process in 1999. While these have expanded the EU’s institutional and normative footprint in the region, they have not enabled structural transformation. Rather than serving as a tool to overcome challenges of democratic lag, economic and social development, and full integration into the EU’s single market, the Growth Plan risks merely accompanying them.

Thus, the persistent barriers in factors of production between the Western Balkans and the EU will continue, just as the facilitation of transfers and banking services for citizens and businesses in our region will remain negligible compared to what the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) offers to citizens and businesses operating within the EU.

In the case of Central and Eastern European countries, integration into the EU single market was a major driver of regional cooperation and increased trade among them—only after joining the EU. This proves the irreplaceable role of the single market in economic development and rule-based trade. Therefore, an emphasis on a regional common market does not meet the need and aspiration of the Western Balkans for sustainable economic development.

If we compare the €2 billion grant of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans with the €357 billion grant for EU member states under NextGenerationEU, the contrast is staggering. Over the budgetary cycle that coincides with the Commissioner’s ambition for Montenegro and Albania to close their accession talks, the Western Balkans will receive EU grants averaging €619 per capita. Meanwhile, per capita grants in neighboring EU member states range from €3,540 for Slovenians to €5,700 for Greeks—clear evidence that the development gap is not narrowing but deepening.

Decisive Action, Not Gradualism

The project of European consolidation in our region requires decisive two-way action, not gradualism that cements the status quo. It involves three things:

1. A credible, coordinated promise between the European Commission and EU member states that each country can realistically achieve membership.
2. A cooperative domestic political environment, with a clear timeline for implementing reforms stemming from accession talks, and a shared commitment to defending and promoting national interests within the EU.
3. Financial assistance and supportive programs to meet standards and bridge the development gap.

To close where I began, with Weber’s haunting dilemma of the tension between the “ethic of conviction” (the consolidation of the European project is irreversible) and the “ethic of responsibility” (concrete work and willingness to make sacrifices by those who wish to join this project), although he acknowledged the moral strength of the first, Weber supported the second. Because a true political project, such as the consolidation of the European project, requires passionate commitment and a deep sense of responsibility from both sides: the Western Balkan countries and the EU.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ditmir Bushati, former Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, former Member of the Albanian Parliament.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation or the organizations the authors work for.