The year 2024 is set to be marked by wars and elections, events that will deeply affect the fate of much of the global population. In terms of security, the starting points of 2024 could be traced to October 7th of the previous year—when the bloody conflict in the Middle East reignited—or to February 24th, 2022, when Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine.
These two major conflicts have brought about a new global divide. After the invasion of Ukraine, the West led a broad coalition of states at the United Nations in condemning Russia's unprecedented aggression. NATO regained its raison d'être, adapted its strategic concept, and expanded its security perimeter in Europe by welcoming new members. Perhaps the most surprising element has been the EU’s response. Its sanctions packages against Russia, the political approach to bringing Ukraine closer to accession talks, and the economic and military support provided to Ukraine have all demonstrated EU unity beyond usual expectations—especially considering Russia has historically been one of the most divisive issues in EU foreign policy.
However, the resurgence of the bloody conflict in the Middle East overturned the West’s global standing, exposing catastrophic internal divisions within both the EU and the broader Western alliance. Nowhere was this more evident than in UN votes, where the West appeared fragmented. The conflict, accompanied by an influx of refugees toward EU borders, has also had a major impact on European domestic politics, fueling new waves of antisemitism and Islamophobia, alongside growing threats of terrorism.
These two wars have also reshuffled international priorities. In particular, for the United States, continued military support for Ukraine has taken a backseat due to the Middle Eastern conflict—evident from Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s five visits to the region since October 7th.
Still, a sustainable and mutually acceptable resolution to either conflict remains out of sight. Regardless of battlefield outcomes, a dramatic rise in radicalization remains a looming threat. Israeli Jews feel isolated and judged after enduring the worst violence against them since the Holocaust. Meanwhile, Palestinians face what they consider a crime against humanity, with no prospects for peace or statehood. The deep political divides surrounding this conflict stretch across the Middle East and reverberate globally.
Israelis must recognize that even if Hamas is neutralized, long-term security is impossible without a regional security agreement and full normalization with their Arab neighbors—building on the Abraham Accords. None of this can be achieved without a clear path toward the establishment of a Palestinian state.
On this issue, messages from the annual Davos meeting were cautiously optimistic, although it’s worth remembering that two years ago, no participant at the Munich Security Conference anticipated Vladimir Putin would soon invade Ukraine. Secretary Blinken noted that “Arab and Muslim countries beyond the region are prepared to establish relations with Israel in terms of integration, normalization, and security—something that was not previously the case—to ensure Israel is both integrated and secure in the region.” Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal Bin Farhan echoed this, stating his country remains committed to normalization with Israel under clear conditions and a firm commitment to a Palestinian state.
Meanwhile, the ongoing war in Ukraine, now entering its third year, continues to generate insecurity for Ukrainians and frustration for Europeans. As a key security issue, ending the war in Ukraine remains a top priority for Europe in 2024. If the EU cannot secure peace and stability on its eastern flank, instability may gradually spill over into the rest of the continent. The Western Balkans remains a vulnerable region—due to unresolved conflicts since the breakup of Yugoslavia—where Russia’s disruptive role is perceived as a threat to regional stability.
In this regard, the EU appears weak, lacking unity in addressing unresolved statehood issues and tolerating Serbia’s destabilizing influence in the region. Despite expectations of a strategic shift, the painful reality is that the Western Balkans remains as politically and economically distant from the EU as it was before the current geopolitical transformation. This, despite repeated mutual pledges that Western Balkan integration into the EU is a strategic objective.
Serbia has not aligned with Western sanctions against Russia, reinforcing the perception that the Western Balkans is not a coherent political region, nor is it aligned with EU standards. Economically, the gap between the region and the EU is not narrowing. Even if the EU fulfills its latest commitments described in the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans—discussed during the regional leaders' meeting in Skopje—economic convergence with the EU is unlikely to progress significantly. The proposed funding would provide the region with six to eight times less development aid compared to the EU’s neighboring member states.
As is well known, funding is tied to the rule of law, an area in which the region consistently falls short. Moreover, the accession process itself does not necessarily reflect reform progress. Another under-discussed issue is the transfer of significant wealth from Southeast Europe to Western Europe—partly due to trade deficits, debt payments, and the outflow of human capital. In other words, the current political and economic relationship between the EU and the Western Balkans is neither making the region more developed economically, nor more democratic in terms of liberal values and institutions.
To end the war, the Euro-Atlantic community must show Russia a firm resolve by taking concrete steps to prepare Ukraine for a peaceful future. The EU must acknowledge the need for a new European security architecture—one that, in light of unprecedented aggression, does not allow countries like Serbia to remain in a geopolitical gray zone. Similarly, promises of EU enlargement must be accompanied by tangible steps and clear timelines.
Viewed in this context, the natural question arises: can today’s black spots become tomorrow’s bright horizons?
The year 2024 will be decisive, as nearly 50 countries—representing half of the world’s population—will go to the polls, culminating in the U.S. presidential election. The outcome will influence not just Americans but also the global landscape. Vladimir Putin has no reason to worry, as he is expected to secure a fifth term in March. In the EU, ten countries will hold elections, with the European Parliament vote being a major focus. The United Kingdom will also head to the polls—a political shift there could help thaw relations between London and Brussels. Major Asian democracies like India and Indonesia will also choose new leaders, as their fast-growing economies gain increasing global clout.
Ultimately, the way these two major conflicts are addressed will depend heavily on electoral outcomes in key global power centers. These elections will determine the strategic course for the coming, turbulent years. That is precisely why we need the best possible crew to guide the journey ahead.ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Ditmir Bushati is a former Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs and a former Member of the Albanian Parliament.
Rr. Kajo Karafili Nd-14, Hyrja 2, Kati 1 Tiranë, Albania
+355(0)4 22 50 986
info.tirana(at)fes.de
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