Clouds of confusion - Ditmir Bushati, November 2024

For Americans, there are several important influencing factors that merit deeper analysis, ranging from prejudices whether a woman can be elected president; whether the 'Trump phenomenon' is an aberration to the political rule or a "bitter pill" for the hypocrisy and the corrosive liberal elite disengaged from the needs of ordinary people; to the true meaning of representation in politics, its relations with money, the techno-feudal lords of the information age; and the fact that perceptions of reality are becoming more powerful than reality itself, as long as algorithms shape political debate on various social platforms.
 
Donald Trump's return to the White House reaffirmed the global trend of people embracing change this election year. Meanwhile, Republicans will hold the majority in the Congress and the Senate, along with the conservative majority of the Supreme Court. For at least two years, President Trump can do almost anything he wants, undisturbed by other powers. Recent picks to key positions show that Trump sees this election triumph as a confirmation of his belief that populism on social issues, job creation, border security, ending wars, trade and foreign policy under the motto "America First," is the way forward for the country and a reflection of the wishes of the majority of the American people.
 
Internationally, there is a cloud of confusion on the potential impact of the Trump administration in many parts of the world. A fundamental change is expected compared to both the Biden administration and the first Trump administration, due to: the two major war fronts Russia-Ukraine and the Middle East; the lack of strong leadership at the European level, as a result of the crushing electoral defeats of the leading elites in Germany and France; the shaping of an alternative alliance, rather than adhering to rules based international order, by countries with a sizeable geography and population; and the more complex and competitive international architecture.
 
The cloud of confusion looms large on how relations between Americans and Europeans will be developed within the Euro-Atlantic community. The Obama administration marked the beginning of the shift of US strategic priorities pivoting from Europe towards Asia and the Pacific. The brutal reaction of the first Trump administration to Europeans’ failure to meet the obligations stemming from NATO membership originated from the fact that for a part of Europeans, beginning with French President Macron, NATO had lost the purpose of its existence. However, the American insistence not only “shook" NATO out of its slumber, but it also prepared it to respond to Russia's aggression against Ukraine.
 
The Biden administration established a stable relation between the US and Europe in responding to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Biden will be the last Euro-Atlantic president in the White House, with a viewpoint shaped bythe Cold War, who recognized the necessity of coordinating foreign policy and actions with European allies. Meanwhile, as already seen throughout his first presidency, the newly elected President Trump has a different approach to the engagement with allies and the world. More than other countries’ internal political systems or alliances based on shared values in multilateral institutions, he is interested in cutting deals, regardless of state orientation, believing in the American strength in the areas of defense, economy, natural resources, and technology.
 
This will be the fundamental challenge for the European allies, who, since the end of the World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall, consider their relationship with the US as the one based on shared values and interests, with a focus on commitment to collective security, the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms, and a transparent and multilateral free trade system.
 
Precisely because of this approach, the incoming Trump administration also represents an opportunity to build a wider network of non-traditional allies, beginning with the Persian Gulf monarchies, as well as a direct engagement with permanent adversaries such as Russia or North Korea, in order to deter or end conflicts and wars. The Gulf countries and Israel were the first countries Trump traveled to as president during his first term and where he made the most diplomatic progress through the Abraham Accords, which are still in effect despite the bloody wars in Gaza and Lebanon. It should not come as a surprise if President Trump returned there for his first trip. This time, in an effort to expand the Abraham Accords and contain Iran, in order to establish a stable security architecture in the Middle East.
 
President-elect Trump has repeatedly stated that he will end Russia's war in Ukraine within a day, despite the fact that dynamics on the ground are shifting as a result of President Biden's decision to allow Ukraine to use long-range American missiles. Although an end to the war is a desirable goal for all, the prospect of a lasting peace or cease-fire is slim. Therefore, it remains to be seen how this objective can be achieved, what steps will be taken, and whether or not coordination will be maintained with European allies. And above all, what would be the future of Ukraine.
 
Viewed through the prism and web of frozen conflicts in Europe, the way this war will end will have an inevitable impact on Europe’s security architecture, including our region. As the newly appointed EU's foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas rightly noted, "Russia's defeat in its war in Ukraine is the surest way not to worry about the World War III”.

If the Trump administration's actions on Ukraine are not coordinated with European allies, it will be a test for the Europeans to demonstrate their capacity to stand and act together, despite the US, whose presence they have relied on for many decades. So far, the European response to Ukraine has been unified, principled, and strategic, beyond all expectations. The EU and its Member States have provided 43 billion Euros in military aid, reinvented the European Peace Facility, and welcomed 4 million Ukrainian refugees. On a political level, the EU took steps towards eastern enlargement by granting candidate status and the decision to start accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova. All this could not be imagined before February 24, 2022.
 
For the Poles, Baltics, and Nordics, Ukraine is a major security issue. Finland and Sweden gave up their policy of neutrality and joined NATO precisely because of the Russian threat. However, a number of European countries far from the battlefront are paying significant economic costs as a result of the war. Hungarian  prime minister Orban insists on ending the war and normalizing relations with Russia. In such circumstances, the question arises: will the Europeans remain united in the face of potential unilateral actions by the Trump administration? Unilateral actions, along with increased US tariffs on European goods, as promised by President-elect Trump during the campaign, could cause major geopolitical rifts within the Euro-Atlantic family, affecting the entire continent, or a wider European realignment. 
 
The current European order is built on three pillars that have been dramatically challenged: blurring the distinction between Europe and the US through the creation of one Euro-Atlantic community; blurring the boundary between internal and external affairs through the EU deepening policy; and blurring the difference between the core and the periphery through the enlargement and neighbourhood policy. The EU must repair the above pillars, of which only one is related to Europe's cooperation with the US. The remaining two are fully dependant on the will of the EU Member States.
 
Although the Europeans have increased their commitment to NATO, the security of the continent depends to a considerable extent on the support of the US. EU’ foreign policy is closely connected to that of the US, whether in relation to the Middle East or China. Europe has fallen behind the US and China in terms of technology and has not sufficiently diversified its economic partnerships. It mostly relies on trade relations with the United States. Recently, it has reduced its energy reliance on Russia. In other words, the EU remains vulnerable to trade conflicts and a new multipolar security order.
 
Furthermore, today's EU is not only more geopolitically exposed, but also more politically divided, in terms of the model it presents, the need for reform, its functioning and decision-making, and the competing agendas related to the enlargement process and the consolidation of the European project both in its south and east.
 
At the European Political Community summit in Budapest following the US elections, Hungarian prime minister Orban considered his privileged relationship with Trump as an opportunity for the EU to advance its interests, end the war on the continent, and normalize relations with Russia. However, it remains unclear what the conditions to end the war are and what normalization of relations with Russia means. At the height of OSCE-ODIHR criticism of Georgia’s parliamentary election, prime minister Orban paid a visit to Tbilisi to praise the process, triggering a wave of criticism from the majority of EU Member States.
 
Similarly, Hungary has increased its economic presence in our region and its political patronage, building preferential relations with Serbia, North Macedonia, and the Republika Srpska, as well as pragmatic relations with Albania. Although one of the first countries to recognize Kosovo's independence, the opposing attitudes of recent years towards Kosovo's aspirations to become member of international organizations are evidence of the fact that the EU's policy towards Kosovo is now a policy with 21 recognizing states, minus 5 non-recognizing ones, and Hungary with its own policy, which paralyzes the common European stance and action for ending the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo and ensuring their membership in the EU.
 
Meanwhile, French President Macron's repeated appeal to reduce dependence on the US and make efforts to move away from the EU to the European Political Community does not match the political reality or the aspirations of a good part of Europeans. An intergovernmental format with a diversified political geography and without decision-making and instruments, the European Political Community could not replace neither the indispensable presence of the US in Europe nor the transformative process of EU membership.
 
The current moment is decisive for significant changes to the European integration project. Clarity will follow the confusion, allowing us to comprehend whether the continent is moving forward or in the wrong direction. Certainly, the weakening of the Euro-Atlantic relationship is not a good omen for our region, where the US is seen as the enforcer of the security perimeter and the Europeans as "allergic" to force. However, this implies the need for increased European vigilance to strengthen the deterrent capacity of KFOR troops in Kosovo and EUFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as two critical spots for regional security.
 
The EU’s free-value exercise of geopolitics, as a "calming pill", in the absence of the accession process for the countries of the region, has eroded the trust of the citizens in the EU. Although the EU has had a leading role in the region in terms of the values and standards it embodies, the enlargement process has not translated into improved level of democracy and democratic standards, or well-being for the citizens of the region.
 
President-elect Trump's pledge to deport undocumented immigrants from the US reflects a trend within the EU that, in the absence of a common policy, has allowed Member States to drift further away from upholding the international law, as seen in the case of the agreement between Italy and Albania to establish "immigrant return centres" in Albania. The same holds true of the lithium agreement between Germany and Serbia, which gives the impression that EU prioritizes critical materials and immigration in order to achieve its own strategic goals. Unfortunately, at the expense of democracy and the rule of law in the Western Balkans.
 
The examples above demonstrate how the EU can be "balkanized" or "reshaped" as a result of compromises at the expense of the values and standards of the enlargement process, particularly over the last decade. They undermine its capacity to show itself as a united front in the Western Balkans, making citizens feel as they are not part of the European family but rather its periphery, serving to solve the "problems" of Europe.

If the first Trump administration shook NATO out of its slumber, Donald Trump’s return to the White House should provide impetus for clarifying the common goals of the EU and the future of the European project. "This is Europe's hour," Luxembourg's foreign minister, Jacques Poos, proudly said in 1991, as he led efforts on behalf of the EU to find a solution to the conflict that erupted in the former Yugoslavia. Indeed, the solution came from the US, whose determination stopped the wars and ensured peace. Although a quarter of a century has passed since the end of the wars in the region, the EU has yet to demonstrate its ability to end the conflicts and anchor all the countries of the region in EU. In the present geopolitical circumstances, the EU has once again been challenged to be at the highest levels that times require.