03.10.2025

How to Act in a Geopolitical Recession - Ditmir Bushati, October 2025

It has been some time since the United Nations has found itself in a difficult situation, becoming a battleground of tensions among the great powers, which constantly hinder diplomacy and effective action, especially in the Security Council. Consequently, the atmosphere surrounding last week’s annual high-level meeting of the UN General Assembly was filled with growing criticism about the usefulness of the organization. Harder to manage is the liquidity crisis, with a number of member states failing to pay their contributions. This means that the UN must restructure and cut costs.

This year’s meeting coincided with the UN’s 80th anniversary. Born in 1945 from the ruins of a devastating war, the organization was a bold challenge to despair and violence. The UN Charter embodied the daring hope that law, dignity, and solidarity could shape a fairer and more peaceful world. Eight decades later, this vision is teetering on the edge. This was reflected in most world leaders’ speeches, which emphasized that global order, balance, and dynamics are changing — much like they did after World War II, when the UN was founded.

It must be acknowledged that the liberal world order was never fully liberal, never fully global, and not always rules-based. However, for several decades we were fortunate that it was liberal, global, and rules-based enough. I say fortunate because Albania, Kosovo, and Albanians in general would not be where we are today without the existing order, in which fundamental human rights and freedoms were prioritized. We must learn from history but always look toward the future, bearing in mind that our attitudes and decisions will shape it.

We are now living through a geopolitical recession, based primarily on the power of global actors and unilateral actions. Unlike the fluctuations of an economic recession, the seismic plates of geopolitics take longer to stabilize. The way the UN functions and the calls for its comprehensive reform reflect both the desire and the inability of our time — while the need for international cooperation grows, the possibility of achieving it diminishes.

The global pandemic, the bloody wars and humanitarian catastrophes in Ukraine and Gaza (among others), as well as challenges related to climate, demography, global food supply chains, rapid technological developments, and their potential misuse, all demand international regulation or at least a common denominator. Meanwhile, the paralysis of the Security Council, the erosion of norms and human rights, combined with selective sensitivity to human suffering, reveal a torn moral structure. Although multilateral institutions like the UN — where states “meet” and dialogue — still stand, their foundations are weakening, while the political will to act is lacking.

We live in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, we have at our disposal what could be called the “internationalization of thought and action,” thanks to decades of accumulated experience in international cooperation. On the other hand, we face unprecedented uncertainty and insecurity.

The United States, considered the architect of the post-World War II international order, under President Donald Trump, has become its loudest critic. Although it is difficult to admit publicly, in closed-door meetings many statesmen and foreign policy professionals share the concerns expressed by the U.S. president in his UN General Assembly speech about the role of the organization. Nevertheless, everyone recognizes that it is easier to dismantle existing institutions than to build new ones.

The U.S., the largest financial contributor to the UN, has cut and frozen major portions of funding to the organization and its agencies, causing significant difficulties, particularly for humanitarian operations. It was somewhat expected that President Trump would withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Climate Agreement on his first day in office, as well as from a series of other UN structures such as the Human Rights Council and UNESCO, since similar moves were made during his first term. What was unexpected was the wave of cuts and funding freezes directed at the UN and its agencies, justified by the administration’s claim that “the UN should focus on its founding purpose — to support peace and security.”

Meanwhile, China is presenting itself both as a founder and defender of the global order, introducing its Global Governance Initiative, which follows its Global Development, Global Security, and Global Civilization initiatives. China aims to address deficits in global governance stemming from:
(i) inadequate representation of Global South countries in international institutions;
(ii) the erosion of the UN’s authority and violations of international law that destabilize the global order;
(iii) the need for effectiveness in addressing global challenges.

China’s strategy is to position itself as a global power that respects rules, opposes unilateral actions, and offers stability and predictability. Although it cannot financially fill the gap left by the U.S., China is now the second-largest contributor to the UN budget. Unusually, China has paid most of its overdue contributions to the UN to demonstrate its willingness to lead by example.

Major European countries have made it clear that they cannot fill the gaps created by the U.S. in the organization, nor those caused by reduced international aid projects. America’s European allies are doing everything possible to keep the transatlantic bond strong. Even in strained areas of cooperation, it is rare to find a Western leader who views the Trump administration as an adversary. Conscious of their limitations, Europeans are cautious not to expose themselves to sudden U.S. policy shifts.

On the other hand, it is exaggerated to speak of forming an anti-American bloc or alliance, even though the G7 remains essentially divided in its lack of harmony with the U.S. The BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) is not cohesive enough to offer a real alternative. At best, BRICS is an ad hoc alliance aimed at balancing interests.

For example, China and India are strategic competitors, with India’s interests tied to the West. Russia views the West as an adversary and openly challenges the post-Soviet European order, while China is positioned between both sides. Russia’s foreign policy, especially after the invasion of Ukraine, has revealed its growing dependence on China. Even if Russia aspires to autonomy and to act as a major power against both the West and China, its room for maneuver is limited. In short, resentment toward the West and particularly the U.S. does not automatically create a coherent alliance bound by shared principles, institutions, and commitments.

Viewed in this context, the natural question arises: How should small countries like Albania orient and act during a geopolitical recession that seems likely to last for a long time?

The weight of a small country stems from its ability to cooperate based on a core of principles and values. In this way, it can build trust and earn respect. Smart diplomacy — not opportunistic diplomacy — gives smaller players at least relative influence.

The UN is a concrete example that Albania has not fully leveraged. Too often, foreign policy debates mistakenly focus on whom Albania voted for, rather than what it voted for, what principles and values guide our foreign policy, and how these can be realized through sustainable strategic alliances and international engagement.

Public attention gets lost in bureaucratic technicalities, stimulating black-and-white debates — whether Albania sided with the U.S. or the EU, pleased Israel, Turkey, or the Gulf countries — almost never placing the debate in the context of our history, our suffering and challenges, or our national values and principles.

Despite having valuable experience as a member of the UN Security Council during 2022–2023, Albania’s wavering positions — on condemning Hamas’s terrorist acts without hesitation, respecting innocent civilians, adhering to international law during the Gaza humanitarian catastrophe, supporting a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine, or its contradictory sponsorship of two different UN General Assembly resolutions on Ukraine in February this year (reflecting transatlantic differences) — highlight the need for strategic clarity and consistent foreign policy objectives beyond momentary opportunism.

A firm stance during a geopolitical recession is crucial for credibility on the international stage. While small countries like Albania may feel pressured to balance the competing interests of major powers, it is essential to remain faithful to core values, building a reputation for principled diplomacy, demonstrating integrity toward international law, and pragmatism in pursuing peace and protecting human life.

There is a growing tension between those who promote a rules-based international order and those who speak the language of power and unilateral action. States pursuing transactional foreign policies abound, as do those belonging to multiple, sometimes competing, political alliances.

Respecting one’s history, empathizing with other peoples’ suffering, and promoting a value- and principle-based foreign policy rooted in human rights and international law do not contradict a realistic approach to international relations. Power sets the limits of what is possible for each state. Nevertheless, values must be the foundation of everything we do. Every foreign policy action must rest on a core of fundamental values. Ignoring them only ensures that the same problems will resurface. Our interests may evolve, and we have the right to pursue them — but no matter how small we are, our choices have consequences.

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ditmir Bushati, former Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, former Member of the Albanian Parliament.

 

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation or the organizations the authors work for.

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