Post Pax Americana - Ditmir Bushati, December 2025

If it were the product of another American administration, the strategy would have been a topic of debate mainly among professionals. However, the heightened attention stems from the fact that this document represents a radical shift in the reorientation of U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, defining a new foreign policy doctrine: “America First.” In one way or another, the strategy confirms the positions held by the Trump administration throughout this year.

The National Security Strategy is not about values. It is not about promoting democracy. Nor is it about defending principles that European allies have taken for granted since the end of the Second World War. It is about the projection of American power and interests. The projection of power is based on a transactional premise that must benefit Americans and not necessarily the principles that should be followed to achieve the objective. At the same time, the strategy reminds us that international relations are not very different from human relations, where not everything and anything has equal value.

The strategy defines the general parameters of how the Trump administration views the world by focusing on threats and strategic priorities such as alliances, defense, trade, and technological advantage. The document makes it clear that the priorities of the Trump administration are: (i) border security and the fight against international crime with particular emphasis on narco-terrorism and drug cartels; (ii) cementing American primacy in the Western Hemisphere by reaffirming the “Monroe Doctrine,” according to which any intervention by other foreign powers in the politics of the American continent is a potentially hostile act against the United States; (iii) confronting China to win the economic future and prevent military confrontation, with particular emphasis on the defense of Taiwan; (iv) redefining the conditions for stability within Europe and strategic stability with Russia; (v) peace in the Middle East, while respecting their traditions, religions, and cultures, as long as they do not threaten the United States.

A destructive geopolitical environment

The withdrawal or rationalization of American action in the world is not a new phenomenon. After the international prominence of Woodrow Wilson, the United States retreated into a form of isolationism during the 1920s–1930s, rejecting the League of Nations and adopting neutrality acts to avoid international entanglements, driven by war fatigue and economic depression, until the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 forced the United States to engage in the Second World War.

The National Security Strategy is presented at a destructive geopolitical moment. According to the United States, the approach of “one size fits all around the world” no longer works. In fact, change on the global level is no longer theoretical, as we are witnessing major war fronts in Europe and the Middle East, a troubled relationship between the United States and Europe, the lack of strong leadership at the European level as a result of the erosion of the democratic center, the formation of alternative alliances to the West by countries with significant geography and population, and a more complex and competitive international architecture.

The strategy aims to reflect the deficit created between power and the expectations of public opinion. The vast majority of Americans do not want to pay for foreign policy and do not support the positioning of the United States as a “firefighter” of conflicts in different corners of the world.

Last year Americans voted for less foreign policy, which is not an exception to presidential elections over recent decades. In 1992, Americans voted for Clinton, who came from a modest experience as governor of Arkansas, incomparable to that of President Bush, who was a protagonist of the fall of the Berlin Wall and epochal changes. The same can be said for the year 2000, when Americans chose Bush over Al Gore, a personality engaged in international relations while serving two terms as vice president; in 2008, when they chose the young senator Obama over the internationally seasoned senator and war veteran McCain; or in 2016, when they chose Trump over Clinton, who came with experience as a senator from New York and later as secretary of state.

What the above-mentioned presidents have in common is that they were elected on the basis of a promise of a more limited foreign policy, but became more involved in foreign policy while in office. Trump is no exception to this rule. The fact that during the first year of this presidential term he speaks about regime change in Venezuela, humanitarian intervention in Nigeria, the rebuilding of Gaza, and the need to end the war in Europe shows that he does not belong to the school of limited interventions in foreign policy. On the contrary! Therefore, the main dilemma for the United States today is not simply what it cannot do, but to avoid what it cannot do.

The character of European security

The U.S. National Security Strategy confirms a trend observed since the time of the Obama administration, according to which the United States sees Asia as the central stage, while Europe no longer has the same importance, either strategically or culturally. My experience during these months at Harvard University has been a surprise in itself, in that our continent receives little attention compared to Latin America, the Indo-Pacific, or the Middle East, even in the world of thought and not only that of politics. The strategic horizons of the Indo-Pacific have gained priority over transatlantic ties. Despite changes in administrations from Biden to Trump and the different approaches these administrations have toward Europe, it must be acknowledged that Americans do not feel themselves to be in a state of war with Russia, unlike Europe where the consequences of the war are evident.

The strategy, which calls on Europe to take “primary responsibility for its own defense, without being dominated by any adversarial power,” should also be read as a wake-up call. For a long time, Europe had become accustomed to the “Truman Doctrine,” according to which Americans guaranteed security on the continent and assisted the democratic transition in Europe. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Americans were involved in guaranteeing security on the continent, ending the war in the former Yugoslavia, and also the process of NATO enlargement.

For nearly eight decades, U.S. foreign policy was shaped by the mindset of the Cold War and its consequences. Figures such as Kissinger, Brzeziński, and Albright, who came as refugees from Europe together with their personal histories, influenced the strengthening of ties between the United States and Europe throughout the formulation and execution of American foreign policy.

Today the demographic reality in the United States is different from that of the Cold War and the period that followed it. This is the reason why, for the first time, the National Security Strategy caused bitterness and shock among the world of thought in Europe, due to its direct and in some cases harsh language toward the European project. Plainly put, the United States is asking Europe to oversee its part of the world. And more importantly, to pay for it itself. American leaders since the time of President Kennedy in 1963 have asked more of Europe to share the burden in NATO. Calls that have been systematically ignored by Europe. The Trump administration differs from previous administrations in its insistence on making such a thing a reality.

Naturally, the weakening of Euro-Atlantic relations is not a good omen for Europe, where the United States has been considered the guarantor of the security perimeter. The situation appears even more critical in our region, where American intervention has been decisive in stopping genocide and war crimes and in conditions where the EU has failed to address unfinished statehood projects. The weakening of Euro-Atlantic relations is not a good omen for the United States either, since Europe is their natural ally in confronting other powers.

The insistence on Europe “standing on its own feet” is the main indicator of a break with the traditional U.S. approach to guaranteeing defense on our continent. But even in a more friendly political climate, structural changes would challenge the credibility of U.S. security commitments, as they prepare for competition with two nuclear powers, China and Russia. The emerging nuclear multipolarity makes the old model of defense more difficult and more dangerous to guarantee indefinitely.

The National Security Strategy also reveals a major contradiction between Europe’s view of itself and the Trump administration’s vision for Europe’s future, as it distinguishes between Europe and the European Union, criticizing the latter as the cause of the loss of Europe’s true and former character. The document also makes a clear reference to American support for the countries of Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, recycling the categorization of “new” and “old” Europe by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld during the American intervention in Iraq, which was not supported by European allies such as France and Germany.

Nevertheless, as the National Security Strategy itself confirms, its aim is to help Europe become stronger, in order to deter any adversary that seeks to dominate Europe. The direct language should serve as an opportunity to strengthen the character of European security.

The character of future European security and relations with Russia will be determined by how the war in Ukraine ends. Europe must combine reactive reflexes with the need to have a clear plan for how today’s war should end and how tomorrow’s peace on the continent should be built. Europe must accelerate the process of building defense capacities. Without speed, simplification of procedures, and political determination, Europe risks becoming an insignificant geopolitical actor.

For this, Europe needs the alliance with the United States, especially in the fields of intelligence and nuclear defense. The “strategic stability with Russia” sought by the National Security Strategy cannot be read as a victory for Russia in Europe, which would have long-term consequences even for the United States itself. Rather, it should be read in light of the conclusions of the NATO Summit in The Hague in June of this year, where Russia is considered a “threat to Euro-Atlantic security.”

While the document should be examined critically, it is important to avoid dogmatic assessments. For a long time, we lived under the thumb of “market believers,” who accepted no criticism of the magic of the market and capitalism. “Liberal believers” are showing the same symptoms as the “market believers” once did. They dismiss any idea contrary to their worldview, without being able to examine reality and alternatives critically, accompanied by a lack of a success-oriented mindset. Forgetting that in the time we live in, foreign policy resembles more the challenges of an athlete, with the necessary physical preparation, victories, falls, and pushes in pursuit of winning the race, than an academic exercise, where the best is rewarded with the highest grade.

Instead of preaching yesterday, which will not return, it is worth paying the appropriate short-term costs for the long-term benefit of the post–Pax Americana period in Europe. A more strategic Europe, with full defense capabilities, capable of acting as an equal alongside other geopolitical powers.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ditmir Bushati, former Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, former Member of the Albanian Parliament.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation or the organizations the authors work for.