The Breakdown of Trust - Ditmir Bushati, February 2026

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Munich Security Conference also transformed into a forum for dialogue between transatlantic policymakers and opinion-shapers and their counterparts from other powers and continents. For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s speech in Munich in 2007 marked a turning point in Russia’s policy and positioning in the post–Berlin Wall period — from partner to challenger of the rules and values of the global order and the West.

Whenever I have participated in this conference, I have noticed that the main topics of discussion revolved around relations between the West and Russia, China, the middle powers, or the Global South. However, last year the atmosphere changed. U.S. Vice President JD Vance, in his speech, did not hesitate to identify European partners as the “main problem” behind the West’s weakness. This year’s conference report, titled “Under Destruction,” in which the United States is described as a disruptor of the global order built over generations — and without clear ideas for a replacement order — did not reflect a transatlantic partnership, but a growing mistrust.

Due to the tense climate within the transatlantic alliance, this year attention focused on relations within the West itself, eclipsing its relations with other powers. Compared with Vice President JD Vance’s speech last year, Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s address was warmer in tone, seeking to reassure European allies. Although Rubio argued that the fate of the United States would always be intertwined with that of Europe, he made it clear that cooperation would depend on tightening borders, combating migration, and increasing defense spending.

Notably absent from the speech was any mention of Russian aggression in Ukraine, as well as references to democratic values and the shared belief in freedom that once motivated the NATO alliance. Instead, Rubio presented a vision based on “Western civilization,” which would confront what he described as the real enemies: migration, what he framed as climate “cult” narratives, and other forms of modern degeneration.

The essence of the Secretary of State’s message was clear: the United States will continue its partnership with Europe, not necessarily on the basis of shared values, but in accordance with Washington’s interests. This is the vision through which the United States seeks to replace the West of the Cold War — described as the “free world” — with a cultural West rooted in Christianity.

Over the past two decades, the way the United States has defined its national interest within the geopolitical order has gradually changed. President Trump is an accelerator of this process, but not its cause. And this process will continue even when he is no longer in the White House.

This includes a number of policy areas that have been central to the orientation of U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War: a shift from free trade toward industrial policy, subsidies, and higher tariffs; a reduced commitment to collective security in the absence of a visibly greater burden-sharing by European allies within NATO regarding defense costs; opposition to lax border and migration policies; and skepticism toward the promotion of democracy, foreign aid, and the international architecture of multilateral organizations.

Each of these shifts reflects longstanding grievances among American citizens across the political spectrum and has resulted in a gradual — now structural — transformation of U.S. foreign policy at the global level.

If I were to compare the global order and the spirit that characterizes transatlantic relations to a computer, I would say that we are now in the phase of rebooting it, but the programs with which we can work have not yet appeared on the screen. After the end of the Second World War, two main elements shaped international relations. One was the international system — namely the group of multilateral organizations centered around the United Nations. The other was U.S. power. Until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the world was bipolar. Afterwards, the United States became the world’s sole superpower. Although the United Nations remained important, American power weighed just as heavily in global affairs.

The failure of the old order in many respects cannot be denied even by the most ardent supporters of the United Nations. Important issues such as war and climate change become trapped in discussions, resolutions, and votes without ever being addressed effectively. The lack of balanced representation of all continents and the veto power enjoyed by five states in the UN Security Council render decisions impossible.

Viewed in this context, the United States is advancing a different idea, prioritizing an order that emphasizes interstate alliances and states as primary actors rather than multilateral organizations. According to this vision, effective cooperation is best pursued through coalitions of the willing rather than frameworks that distribute authority among multilateral organizations with divergent interests. Collective action works when participating states agree on both the means and the objectives.

On the other hand, Europeans are becoming increasingly aware of this new reality within the transatlantic alliance, where a shift from values to shared interests is taking place. European unity in response to the Trump administration’s stance on Greenland — whether in the security domain or the economic one, by announcing reciprocal tariffs mirroring those declared by the Americans — is the clearest example of this awareness.

Under these conditions, the natural question that arises is whether broken trust in the transatlantic relationship can be restored. This remains possible by starting from a new premise focused primarily on the shared interests of allies on both sides of the Atlantic. It is an undeniable fact that the U.S. National Security Strategy published last November ranks relations with Europe third in priority, after the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific — a shift that began during President Obama’s first administration.

It is equally undeniable that due to the persistent pressure exerted by President Trump’s administration, Europeans are now contributing far more militarily within the alliance. Moreover, they are carrying the main burden of the war in Ukraine.

Europe’s importance in the world will depend on its readiness to live within this new transatlantic reality. While European determination and joint action are likely to continue, most of the energy will be devoted to working within existing transatlantic frameworks, especially NATO. The fact that the United Kingdom and Italy are assuming NATO commands from the United States signals an important step toward creating a European “pillar” within the alliance.

Perhaps at the end of this process, NATO will look different, including in the balance of power and contributions among allies, where the role of the United States will remain irreplaceable, especially in relation to nuclear deterrence, intelligence services, and artificial intelligence.

A European pillar within NATO is the most effective path toward a secure Europe, as the United States reduces its responsibility for the continent’s defense. This is certainly more attainable than transforming the European Union into a military alliance or defending Europe through formalized coalitions of the willing and capable.

But the longer-term perspective can only be one in which European countries are destined to move closer to one another in areas related to their geopolitical position, geographic security, and their capacity to ensure defense, security, and resilience. The road to reaching this point will be uneven. Yet this new transatlantic reality may also serve as an impetus for the emergence of a new Europe.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ditmir Bushati, former Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, former Member of the Albanian Parliament.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation or the organizations the authors work for.