The Dangerous Spiral of Escalation – Ditmir Bushati, April 2024

This display of force reflects a strategic shift by Tehran, which until now has relied on a doctrine of "strategic patience" and carried out attacks against Israel through its proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

Iran embraced the doctrine of "strategic patience" after the U.S. killed General Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad in 2020. Since then, Tehran has taken care to avoid direct confrontation with the U.S. and its regional allies. It even notified the Trump administration before striking American targets in Iraq in retaliation for the killing of its high-ranking military commander.

The direct attack on Israel shows Iran's readiness for confrontation, but in a calculated way that avoids escalation and casualties. Domestically, the readiness and mobilization for war against Israel and its allies stifles protests and movements calling for political change and more civil rights in Iran. Regionally and internationally, Iran does not want to be perceived as weak.

Despite the attack on Israel, Iran’s long-term strategy is built on preserving its achievements over the past decades and avoiding large-scale war. Over the past three decades, Iran has invested in enriching uranium for nuclear weapons development, supporting Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon, supporting Hamas, and strengthening defense cooperation with Russia, China, North Korea, and Venezuela.

On the other hand, Iran aims to reach an agreement with the U.S. and be recognized by Washington as a major regional power. This objective lies at the heart of the conflict with Israel, which refuses to acknowledge Iran as an equally influential regional actor.

The turning point in its relationship with Israel came after Israel launched rockets at an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus, killing several high-ranking Iranian military officials. It is difficult to determine whether the consulate met the criteria established by international law regarding diplomatic protection. Nevertheless, Israel’s strike on the Iranian building in Damascus was considered by Tehran to be an attack "on Iranian soil." From Iran’s point of view, it was Israel that crossed the red line, and last weekend’s attack was nothing more than a retaliation.

Viewed historically, Iran’s attack on Israel represents the first serious external threat to Israel’s security since Saddam Hussein launched missiles at Israel in 1991. However, it must be said that Iran’s retaliation was more a function of wounded pride after Israel’s strike on the diplomatic compound in Damascus. The choreography of the attack was made known to the U.S. in advance via Iraq and Turkey, to minimize damage. This gave Israel time to intercept the drones before they reached Israeli airspace, and allowed its partners to reiterate their firm commitment to Israel’s security.

The U.S. and the United Kingdom used anti-missile systems to intercept Iranian rockets in the airspace over Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. There is no evidence that Iran aimed to hit American or British assets installed in the region. It seems Iran was not seeking a clash with Israel’s Western allies.

The advance notification and selection of military targets suggest that Iran was calibrated in delivering a message to Israel and considers the matter closed from its end. The U.S. had followed a similar playbook in response to Iranian attacks on American service members in Jordan at the end of January. They waited several days before retaliating against Tehran via Iraq, giving the Iranians time to withdraw their forces from the area. In both cases, the goal was not escalation, but reestablishing deterrence and addressing internal pressures in response to the attacks, while avoiding a broader regional conflict.

For Israel, Iran’s subversive agenda is too blatant to be hidden, let alone tolerated. Iran has no plans to stop supporting groups in the region that pose a serious threat to Israel. The building that Israel bombed in Damascus served as a military planning center. Our experience shows that Iran uses diplomatic missions and cultural centers to spread its malign influence. It also conducts cyberattacks to damage critical infrastructure. One thing is certain: since last weekend, the rules of engagement between Israel and Iran have changed.

Israel was caught between the dilemma of retaliation and self-restraint. The chances that Israel would respond — to demonstrate that such attacks cannot be tolerated in the future — were high, especially when weighed against the calls of its allies to de-escalate the situation. Israel’s airstrike near Iran’s Isfahan airbase is a strict and inevitable application of retaliation logic, as it involved striking the airbase from which Iranian drones were launched toward Israel. According to Iranian state media, the damages were negligible, while Israel has remained silent.

More than a frontal strike on Iranian soil, which would have dramatically expanded the conflict, this was a calibrated response that can be read as "managing the escalation of conflict." In other words, Israel’s effort to retaliate without causing further escalation has been successful. A broader conflict is not in the interest of the region or Israel’s supporting allies, especially given that the U.S. is on the brink of presidential elections.

Under the current conditions, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has gained some political breathing room at home, following a long wave of protests organized against his plans to limit the judiciary's role to avoid prosecution, and the war in Gaza, which has caused incalculable human and material damage.

Gaza and its civilians are the biggest losers in this new situation, as international attention has shifted toward avoiding an escalation that would lead to a regional war. Although the roots of the conflict’s spread in the Middle East lie in Gaza and in the failure to enforce the UN Security Council’s resolution demanding an immediate ceasefire and the release of hostages, the situation since October 7 of last year remains dramatic.

For the U.S., curbing Iran’s ambitions in the region is a top priority. Iran’s nuclear program and its efforts to reshape the region according to its desires are major concerns for Washington. It is in this context that we should understand the U.S.'s vigorous actions over the weekend, which aimed to strengthen its Middle Eastern allies while also avoiding casualties.

The consequences of the conflict in the Middle East are felt in Europe more than anywhere else, due to geographical proximity. Since the war in Syria in 2015, there has been a major debate within the EU regarding waves of refugees and whether or not to accept “the other.” Paradoxically, the resurgence of conflict in the Middle East has been accompanied by a rise in both anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in Europe, which serve as fuel for far-right and far-left parties during a year of elections for the European Parliament.

Although diplomacy has so far proven effective in managing this dangerous cycle of escalation, the situation in the Middle East reminds us of World War I, which broke out not because the warring parties wanted it, but because they were unwilling to step away from the dangerous spiral of escalation. In this context, preventing conflict escalation, achieving an immediate ceasefire and the release of hostages in Gaza, building a security architecture in the Middle East that ensures normal relations between Arab countries and Israel, and simultaneously sets out a roadmap for the creation of a Palestinian state are the only alternatives to war.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ditmir Bushati is the former Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs and a former Member of Parliament of the Republic of Albania.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation or the organizations the authors work for.