The Defeat of Liberalism - Ditmir Bushati, June 2025

As in many European democracies, the result reveals a nation almost evenly divided—between conservatives and progressives, between nationalism and liberal internationalism. It also reflects a generation betrayed by the democratic center, increasingly identifying with the far-right or far-left. The result, though narrow, cuts like a sharp blade—deeply divisive.

Two years ago, a multi-colored coalition led by former European Council President and veteran Polish politician Donald Tusk ended the eight-year rule of the conservative Law and Justice party. The Tusk government laid out two major priorities:
(i) restoring public trust in democratic institutions;
(ii) easing political and social polarization.
It appears to have failed on both fronts.

Europe’s history offers many examples of political transformation toward democracy—from right-wing authoritarianism (Portugal, Spain, Greece) to communism (the former Eastern Bloc) or national socialism (Germany, Austria). However, overcoming an illiberal system entrenched during the Law and Justice party’s years in power, through liberal means, was uncharted territory—one that, in Poland’s case, brought more challenges than past transitions.

Upon returning to power in 2023, the Tusk government presented a reform plan aiming to "restore liberal democracy" and place Poland at the heart of Europe’s geopolitical awakening in response to the growing Russian threat. Despite backing from the European Commission and the lifting of EU sanctions against Poland for rule-of-law violations, two critical questions remain unanswered in Tusk’s journey:
On what foundation should institutional rebuilding occur?
Do extraordinary circumstances justify unusual tools—or ones that test the limits of legitimacy?

Answers to these questions may partly explain why the ruling coalition’s candidate, Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski, failed to convince the majority of voters—and more worryingly, the majority of young people—to embrace a pro-European, liberal agenda.

Karol Nawrocki, an unknown figure with no political or international experience, managed to earn the trust of most Poles by focusing his narrative on conservative values, sovereignty, and the protection of Polish traditions.

The clashes between Poland’s two main political camps resemble a pendulum swinging forward and backward. Although the government is responsible for foreign policy, defense, and the economy, the president wields veto power over key legislation, including the budget and appointments in security, defense, and justice.

Given the president’s veto powers and the differing political alignments of the government and president, it is safe to say that the bitter conflict between them, the media, and parts of society aligned with each side will persist until the next parliamentary elections in 2027. All political movements in Poland will now orient toward those elections, making political coexistence between the president and the government increasingly difficult.

As a key EU and NATO member, Poland’s internal strife could affect the EU and NATO’s capacity to respond to the Russian threat. In this new political landscape, Polish–Ukrainian relations will serve as a litmus test. The new president opposes Ukraine’s membership in NATO and the EU, marking a shift from Poland’s long-standing stance. This could weaken front-line allies who have considered Ukraine’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures a long-term strategic priority.

Of particular interest is Poland’s future position within these organizations in relation to the U.S., especially since the newly elected president received support from the U.S. and was welcomed at the White House ahead of the election, while his rival was backed by top European leaders.

To date, Poland has been a vocal advocate for strengthening the EU’s defense industrial base—implying stronger European strategic autonomy and increased defense cooperation. The new president is expected to maintain Poland’s current stance, including defense spending and military modernization, as his close ties with the U.S. suggest continued strong support for NATO.

Simultaneously, he is likely to support military aid to Ukraine, as Ukraine’s victory is vital to Poland’s national interest. Still, it remains to be seen what his approach will be if President Trump’s policy of breaking Russia away from China is pursued at any cost (including at Ukraine’s expense).

The new president is expected to challenge the agenda of EU supranational institutions by reinforcing the sovereignist narrative of the conservative party from which he hails. Even though the Polish government sets the country’s positions in the EU, the president plays a key role in shaping public opinion. While President Nawrocki may not align perfectly with Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán or Slovak PM Robert Fico—especially regarding Russia—they are likely to collaborate in forming alternative perspectives within the EU.

In other words, for Europe, this result means that one of its key countries—particularly concerning European defense, Ukraine’s future, and confronting the Russian threat—will become a weaker and less unified partner, both in the EU and in the "coalition of the willing" formed by the Weimar Triangle (Germany, France, Poland) and the United Kingdom.

Seen from a broader perspective beyond Poland, this result reflects the crisis facing liberal democratic forces shaped by Cold War mentalities. It is a loss for liberalism. Poland’s deep divisions mirror a wider Western trend: the weakening of centrist democratic coalitions that once supported liberal governance, particularly in the decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

However, post–Cold War geopolitics eroded liberalism’s core asset: its clear advantage over illiberal alternatives. Back then, the glue holding liberal coalitions together wasn’t internal cohesion, but contrast with a common external enemy.

Supranational institutions and technocratic governance—often insulated from direct democratic accountability—were seen as stabilizing forces, essential to long-term security and prosperity. The sacrifices demanded by liberal democracy were considered more acceptable than the costs of ideological capitulation. Today, that’s no longer the case.

In his newly published book “What I Learned from You,” former EU Brexit negotiator and prominent French politician Michel Barnier describes Ursula von der Leyen’s leadership of the European Commission as having “authoritarian tendencies.” He portrays the Commission as overly bureaucratic, centralized, and out of touch with citizens’ interests. When such criticism comes from a senior European statesman, it’s easy to understand the political gains that conservative or populist parties are making across EU member states—in the name of national interest, tradition, and sovereignty.

Coalitions promoting liberal democracy are not merely victims of a disgruntled electorate. They also suffer from a lack of compelling proposals to genuinely address reforms tied to democracy and the rule of law, economic inequality caused by globalization and rapid technological change, and the anxiety and uncertainty provoked by unclear or unprincipled stances on migration, social transformation, and the future of the European project amid a hostile geopolitical environment.

This is why, in many countries with a totalitarian past, liberalism is no longer seen as a value-based system hard-won and worth defending, but as a hypocritical ideology serving elite survival. Therefore, more than a victory for conservative forces, Poland’s presidential election represents a defeat for the democratic center. The resilience of liberal democracy will depend on the center’s willingness to offer a credible vision of what liberal democracy can deliver under the pressures of our time.