11.04.2025

To Aspire for the (Im)possible – Ditmir Bushati, April 2025

The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and at the same time Vice-President of the European Commission, Kaja Kallas, when asked by journalists at the press conference in Tirana about the possibility of Albania joining the EU by 2030, emphasized: “it is a realistic objective, but in order to be fulfilled, several steps must be taken, and Albania must adopt and implement reforms in practice.”

On her first visit to Albania, as part of a regional tour, Kaja Kallas gently reminded us of two of the most fundamental aspects of the enlargement process.

First, this process has three actors: the EU member states (decision-makers); the European Commission (the driving force of the European integration process and at the same time the closest friend of the candidate country); and the candidate country aiming for membership (Albania).

Second, reforms can only be fulfilled by creating an inclusive political climate.

It is worth recalling that, in the process of Albania's accession to NATO, alongside geopolitical circumstances, political consensus for the adoption and implementation of reforms in the field of security and rule of law was decisive. In the context of EU membership, this holds even greater value, as unlike NATO accession, this process has a direct impact on almost all areas of life.

EU membership is a national objective that goes beyond political parties. Even more so in the case of Albania, where the connection with Europe has been and remains organic. Europe is a kind of spiritual hearth for Albanians since the times of the Balshaj. Or as Ismail Kadare put it: “our natural state.”

Kaja Kallas should be appreciated for the truthfulness with which she conveyed her messages, which is not always a distinguishing feature of Brussels officials, avoiding feeding false illusions, which the Albanian people do not need. I recall here the European officials who, immediately after the publication of the 2018 Enlargement Strategy, set the year 2025 as a possible date for the accession of Montenegro and Serbia. Such sweet-worded forecasts with no effect in practice need no further elaboration.

For geopolitical reasons, particularly related to the war in Ukraine, the enlargement of the EU has returned to the political agenda. However, the materialization of this process is not a foregone conclusion, as the EU also faces numerous difficulties in managing internal affairs. Therefore, Kaja Kallas rightly referred to the steps that must be taken in this process, primarily implying the EU member states. On the other hand, we must understand that member states will not accept new accessions solely for geopolitical reasons, disregarding the fulfillment of rule of law and good governance reforms.

If they don’t succeed there, they won’t succeed anywhere

Even though it has been more than two years since EU member states asked the European Commission to draft a document for EU reform in light of the enlargement process, they are still not ready for this discussion, nor for the final project of the EU.

Not all EU member states share the same ideas on how the EU should become a functional organization to enable the accession of several candidate countries, including ours, in the new geopolitical context where it must act as an important global actor, alongside the USA, China, Russia, and India.

The examples of France and Germany, traditionally considered as the driving forces of the EU, best reflect this reality. Thus, a few weeks after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, French President Emmanuel Macron outlined his vision for the creation of the European Political Community, with the belief that “the EU cannot remain the only platform to structure the European continent.” This idea is recycled from former French President Francois Mitterrand, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, aiming to avoid a massive and rapid enlargement of the EU with countries newly freed from communist rule.

In both cases, France's concern essentially relates to avoiding the enlargement process. For this reason, the European Political Community attempts to create “strategic intimacy” (intimité stratégique) between European states in the face of Russian aggression. But, in reality, it has been limited to a dialogue platform, where states can discuss things together, even though they do not share common values and goals, far from being a European forum where decisions are made.

On the other hand, the outgoing German government's program pledged to ‘accelerate’ the accession process of Western Balkan countries to the EU. Four years later, this pledge cannot be considered fulfilled. Whereas in the coalition agreement for the upcoming government between Germany’s CDU/CSU and the Social Democrats, enlargement is considered a ‘geopolitical necessity’ and the approach of ‘gradual integration’ is supported, there is no commitment accompanied by deadlines for the conclusion of negotiations and the admission of new states. In the text of the agreement, the consolidation of the EU through its reform is defined as a prerequisite for any possible enlargement.

Not all EU member states are willing to contribute financially or to give up financial benefits in a larger EU. For this reason, in the report drafted by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta, “For the Future of the EU Internal Market”, a solidarity mechanism for enlargement is proposed, which would alleviate the fears of net beneficiary countries, regarding a possible accession of the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and Moldova.

Not all EU member states agree on whether countries that are occupied or in unresolved conflict situations can become part of the EU. Not all EU member states are willing to sacrifice social welfare packages and spend more on security.

It is worth mentioning that in the much-discussed report by former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi, “For the Future of Europe's Competitiveness”, the Western Balkans are not mentioned at all regarding the enlargement process. In fact, the word ‘enlargement’ is used in the past tense and not in the future. The value of eight hundred billion euros through which Draghi envisions Europe becoming competitive is very large compared to the six billion euros the EU offers to the Western Balkans through the Growth Plan, which does not bridge the developmental gap between the EU and the countries of the region.

This year marks the beginning of the drafting of the EU’s multiannual budget, which is also an indicator of political willingness for enlargement. It remains to be seen whether in this budget the proposals of Draghi and Letta for EU countries and those seeking membership will be harmonized.

Despite the new geopolitical context we live in and the above-mentioned proposals, it must be admitted that the ‘engine of enlargement’ with motivating effects on candidate countries remains turned off. EU member states hold the key to starting the ‘engine of enlargement’, just as candidate countries hold the key to using the ‘conditionalities’ in this process as opportunities to change and reform the quality of governance and life.

In the lyrics of the famous song “New York, New York,” it is said: “if I can make it there, I’ll make it anywhere.” The opposite is true in the case of enlargement, where EU member states must understand that “if they don’t make it there (with the Western Balkans), they won’t make it anywhere.”

The sooner a consensus is reached on this, the easier the job will be for the European Commission. In the absence of a green light from EU member states for this process, the European Commission has shown creativity in keeping it alive. However, this is not enough to influence the democratic transformation and economic and social development of candidate countries.

The truth is the best way forward

Is the year 2030 a reachable objective for Albania’s accession to the EU? This question reminds me of May 1st, 2004, when in the hall of the Academy of Arts in Tirana, we organized a debate on this topic together with the ambassadors of countries that had just been admitted to the EU. To the audience’s question of ‘when will Albania join the EU’, we replied with some optimism: ‘perhaps within a decade’, disappointing the expectations of participants in the debate for whom a decade seemed more like a horizon than a tangible objective.

Likewise, on June 12, 2006, when Albania signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, which to this day remains the main contract between Albania and the EU, to a national television’s question about when Albania will join the EU, I replied: “if everything is implemented according to the provisions of the agreement, within a decade.”

In truth, our path toward the EU, since 1990, resembles a steep road, which does not justify the enthusiasm and popular support for this process. It is linked to the process of democratic state-building, reflecting the weaknesses of our democratic tradition, the difficulty of cultivating the best European values of the rule of law, extreme polarization, and the unilateral breaking of political rules of the game.

We missed a chance on our path toward the EU, which seemed dynamic in the early 1990s, and several such chances in the early 2000s. We stayed at the table for over three years to sign the SAA, it took us five years to obtain candidate status, and thirteen years to begin membership negotiations with the EU.

The same can be said about absorbing EU funds in the form of grants, where Albania ranks second to last, leaving only Bosnia and Herzegovina behind. Or about European investments in the form of loans and grants, where we are on the same level as North Macedonia and leave behind Montenegro and Kosovo.

We’ve lost a lot of time along the way. And in most cases, we have obstructed ourselves in this process. The above story is not merely a lesson from the past, but the key to facing today’s challenges and predicting the future. Viewed in this context, setting a timeframe within which we aim for EU membership, if not accompanied by a platform as inclusive and unifying as possible that stimulates a different quality and pace for democratic state-building reforms and absorption of EU funds, is at best to aspire for the (im)possible.

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ditmir Bushati, former Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, former Member of the Albanian Parliament.

 

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation or the organizations the authors work for.

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