An Enlarged EU. What Is Possible? - Ditmir Bushati, October 2026

Driven mainly by the security environment the continent faced as a result of Russian aggression in Ukraine, in 2023 European Commission President Von der Leyen called on the EU to engage in a preparatory process that would precede enlargement. In the same year, through the Granada Declaration, the member states set out responsibilities both for the countries involved in the enlargement process and for themselves. The presentation of this document by the European Commission was postponed several times because of political sensitivities in the capitals of EU countries. Nevertheless, the document in itself is a positive development, since enlargement and the reform of how the EU functions are two sides of the same coin.

The pre-enlargement policy reviews rests on four pillars, concerning the EU's values, policies, budget and governance. This document comes after an unprecedented release this year of numerous non-papers by member states calling for a fair balance between enlargement and the way the EU functions. The European Commission therefore aims to address the fears of some EU capitals about admitting poorer and weaker countries with unresolved conflicts; the need to avoid past practices linked to backsliding on the rule of law; geopolitical alignment in an increasingly fragmented world; and resistance to shifting balances and to the loss of advantageous positions.

Enlargement could shift the balance of power towards the East. Hypothetically, a Polish-Ukrainian axis would represent around 16% of the EU's population, an important alliance for future votes. If the current voting rules were applied, Ukraine, combined with Moldova and the Western Balkan states, could create a significant voting bloc in the EU. Likewise, Ukraine's accession to the EU would automatically turn a good number of member states from receivers into net contributors to EU funds. The transition from EU pre-accession funding to internal funding requires the enlargement countries to be able to manage EU funds effectively and to guarantee institutional accountability. They must also be able to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute fraud, corruption and other irregularities.

The fulfilment of European standards and values by the states seeking membership will be monitored before, during and after accession, in a stricter manner than in the most recent enlargements to Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia.

The European Commission's approach is pragmatic, within the limits of what is possible under current conditions. The Commission reiterates its long-held conviction that EU enlargement can take place, and EU governance can be ensured at the same time, by adapting within the framework of the EU treaties and the accession treaties, without the need for treaty changes. Referring to the flexibility of existing mechanisms, the European Commission suggests that more decision-making, particularly in foreign policy, should move from unanimity to qualified majority.

It puts forward the same proposal for the EU accession process. According to the Treaty on European Union, unanimous decision-making is required for membership applications. However, the practice and negotiating framework developed over the years show that the Council also acts unanimously on intermediate steps. The Commission proposes moving from unanimity to qualified majority for these steps. This proposal is unlikely to be embraced by EU member states, considering that a good part of the intermediate steps is also subject to parliamentary scrutiny in many member states.

When the positions of EU member states relate to the substance of the reforms required by the EU accession process, rather than to bilateral issues, their intervention, by correcting the European Commission's optimism, serves the quality and irreversibility of reforms. As a result of the insistent positions of some EU member states, the approval of the interim benchmarks assessment report on the rule of law (IBAR), in the case of Albania, was accompanied by more robust safeguards for the implementation of reforms. Similarly, because of Serbia's backsliding on the rule of law, some EU member states did not agree on the European Commission's proposal to open Cluster 3.

The European Commission also sets out scenarios for the future functioning of the Commission itself in an enlarged EU: as now, with each state nominating one commissioner and, because of the large number, vice-presidents coordinating different sectors; or by rotation, taking into account the weight and geography of member states in representation. The voting weight in the Council and representation in the European Parliament would be adjusted according to the current institutional formula, becoming an integral part of the accession treaties.

Representation is a key element in EU accession negotiations. Before the 2004 enlargement, discussions focused mainly on the voting weight Poland would have as the largest country expected to join the EU. It managed to secure 27 votes, same as Spain, even though the latter had a larger population.

In reality, this arrangement reflected a three-way bargain: it preserved symbolic parity between France and Germany, with Germany keeping the same number of votes despite having a larger population than France; it secured Spanish ratification; and it made enlargement politically sellable in Warsaw. Nevertheless, the deal gave Spain and Poland real power, placing them almost on the same level as Germany, France and Italy, which had 29 votes each.

Of all the candidate countries, Montenegro is considered the closest to the EU. The document reconfirms its inclusion in the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework, signalling the EU's political will. Albania, Moldova and Ukraine are also considered to be at an advanced stage of the EU accession process. For these countries, the European Commission will propose roadmaps at the end of the month, as part of the annual enlargement package, to facilitate their path to the EU. This will deepen the dividing line between neighbours leaning towards the EU and those content with the status quo.

The practice of roadmaps is not new. The roadmap for Croatia, published at the end of 2008, set the end of 2009 as the deadline for concluding accession negotiations. At that time, Zagreb had closed only four chapters. Croatia managed to close all chapters by mid-2011 and became an EU member in 2013. This shows that, despite the European Commission's wish to push the accession process forward, ultimately it is the EU member states that decide.

It remains to be seen whether Montenegro, the most advanced country in this process, really needs a roadmap now, given that it is in a better position than Croatia was in 2008. Likewise, Albania is clearly ahead of Moldova and Ukraine.

The Commission has also elaborated several proposals for the gradual integration of candidate countries into the EU in various areas of the internal market and EU programmes, such as energy, transport, digital connectivity, security, defence and resilience. This process will bring tangible benefits for citizens and businesses. Examples are not lacking: Moldova and Ukraine have been included in the "Roam like at home" scheme, and the Western Balkan countries are negotiating to join the same scheme; or the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), which reduces the costs of bank transfers, of which Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, North Macedonia and Moldova are part.

As Enrico Letta rightly says, "the internal market is more than a market. It is full European citizenship, not feeling like an emigrant in the EU. The internal market is the key step in EU enlargement." Seen from this angle, the gradual inclusion of candidate countries in the EU internal market is essential for achieving economic convergence. The proposal for gradual entry into the internal market is not entirely new. The way was paved in 2023 with the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans.

If membership is a long and challenging prospect, prioritising gradual integration into the internal market, similar to what the European Economic Area (EEA) members Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein enjoy, could stimulate economic growth and create closer political and institutional ties.

Even on gradual integration into the internal market, the Commission has been cautious, making clear that there are no shortcuts and linking it to the fulfilment of rule-of-law conditions. The Growth Plan makes financial disbursements conditional on the rule of law. In an effort to revive, at least partially, the EU's normative power, which has lost some of its former lustre, the new scheme goes further, making access to the internal market conditional on justice reform, the fight against corruption and accountability as a governing practice.

As announced in the EU's 2025 enlargement strategy, future accession treaties should contain stronger safeguards against backsliding on commitments made during negotiations, particularly in the areas of the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights. The Commission proposed a common framework for these safeguards for future EU members.

Sectoral safeguards will apply in areas related to the economy, the internal market, justice and home affairs. Their duration and scope will be determined in the accession treaties for each state.

Breaches affecting the institutional functioning of the EU or membership obligations require protection beyond the sectoral level. Providing for institutional safeguards is a new practice in the enlargement process. Under the Commission's proposal, a new member state would not be able to exercise a veto on most foreign policy matters, or block consensus in the European Council, not only on sectoral policies but also on cross-sectoral institutional matters, including decisions related to enlargement. This measure is envisaged to extend for up to 15 years. In this way, new member states will be unable to block EU accession for neighbouring candidate countries, a practice used by some member states against candidates that has undermined the credibility of the enlargement process to date.

The safeguards complement, rather than replace, the "nuclear option" provided for in Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union. The safeguards should be read as a temporary mechanism for exceptional situations during the first years after accession.

It is clear that the enlargement policy review aims to make the EU enlargement-proof with weaker and poorer states. The rule of law and geopolitical alignment are preconditions for this. But in a fragmented world, with rifts even among Euro-Atlantic allies themselves, the EU should not think only about what is possible, but about what must be done. The pre-enlargement policy reviews do not answer the question of what kind of EU we need for the new era we live in. For that, addressing fears through political caution is not enough; what is needed is strategic ambition, which would make the EU crisis-proof to the future.

About the Author

Ditmir Bushati, former Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, former Member of the Albanian Parliament.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation or the organizations the authors work for.