Expansion as a Security Policy - Celik Rruplli, September 2025

This phrase struck harder than usual and was perceived differently this time, not only because of the war in Ukraine and the intensified attacks by Russia in recent months — also targeting European Union and United Kingdom diplomatic missions in Kyiv — but also because, just hours before her speech, Russia had violated Poland’s airspace — which is European Union and NATO airspace — with dozens of drones, which were destroyed by allied defense forces. The violation of Poland’s and Romania’s airspace marked an unprecedented escalation of European security. These developments show that the continent’s security is already challenged and that a collective response is required.

In this context, von der Leyen’s speech about Europe’s independence (defense, technology, energy, and the freedom to choose its own destiny) is directly linked to the issue of enlargement — even though the latter received less space in the speech and less media attention.

And when we talk about enlargement, in her words, we are talking about the reunification of Europe with the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and Moldova, as happened with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. “Because only a united and reunited Europe can be an independent Europe. A bigger and stronger Union is a security guarantee for all of us. And because for Ukraine, for Moldova, for the Western Balkans — their future is in our Union,” added von der Leyen.

This message is essential because Europe’s independence and security are not understood only as military defense but as the integration of political and institutional space across the continent. Therefore, enlargement is not separate from this joint effort but plays a central role.

By fully integrating the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and Moldova into its political and security structures, the EU also strengthens its ability to deter and stop threats coming from third countries.

From this perspective, enlargement must now be understood and seen as part of Europe’s security guarantee and not as a luxury. This is because the countries of the region are already part of the European security ecosystem, contributing to NATO, to sanctions against Russia, and to the management of migration.

Therefore, the real question at this moment is not whether the EU can absorb new members while maintaining its institutional stability (because it demonstrated this with the major enlargement in 2004) but whether it can afford the cost of delaying their integration.

Contributions and Challenges of Candidate Countries

The Western Balkan and Eastern European countries are already contributing to European security by putting their military capacities at disposal.

Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, as NATO members, have supported Kyiv with considerable military, financial, and humanitarian aid (tanks, helicopters, munitions, armored vehicles, etc.). Meanwhile, Serbia, although officially maintaining neutrality and refusing to impose sanctions on Russia while aligning with EU policies, has, according to data until 2024, quietly enabled the transfer of Serbia-produced munitions to Ukraine worth over €800 million. Ukraine is helping EU countries build drone production capacities, while Moldova has actively participated in European defense meetings despite constant pressure from Russia.

Another important aspect of these countries’ contribution is their proactive role in international peacekeeping missions. Albania and North Macedonia are regular contributors to EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia provides medical and military police teams to United Nations peacekeeping missions from Lebanon to Congo, being one of the largest European contributors.

However, the region remains fragile: protests and political polarization in Serbia; institutional crises in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Kosovo facing non-recognition by 5 EU countries, under EU sanctions, and with its Strategic Dialogue with the United States suspended; and repeated vetoes against North Macedonia hinder the process. Albania and Montenegro are advancing toward integration, but the slow pace of reforms causes public frustration.

These weaknesses of the Western Balkan countries — including Ukraine at war and neighboring Moldova — pose operational risks for Europe’s security but do not diminish their role as protective assets.

Nevertheless, despite these specifics, the candidate states in the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and Moldova are among Europe’s most undervalued security assets. This is because, except for Serbia, these countries have aligned their foreign and security policies with the EU, especially regarding sanctions against Russia, despite economic and political costs.

They also already cooperate on energy and cyber security, counterterrorism, migration management, etc. In other words, they are integrated into Europe’s security ecosystem even though they remain formally outside the European Union.

Rethinking the Approach to Enlargement

Faced with this situation, the current gradual enlargement model is not sufficient. In a recent article for Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), former Foreign Minister Ditmir Bushati emphasized that “the project of European consolidation in our region requires decisive two-way action and not gradualism to cement the status quo.” Meanwhile, in her speech shortly afterward, the President of the European Commission stressed that when it comes to enlargement, it must be merit-based. Clearly, the approach to enlargement remains gradual.

However, the urgency brought by the security and defense situation requires the enlargement model to be revised, and for the EU to adopt a layered integration model focused on defense and security, which could include:

• Structured observer status in the EU Foreign Affairs and Security Council;

• Cooperation in defense procurement, cyber warfare, and energy security;

• Gradual access to the internal market and customs union;

In this way, this approach rewards candidate states that already contribute to European security, maintains the set conditions for membership, and accelerates integration where it is strategically imperative.

Although EU membership does not offer protection similar to NATO’s Article 5, it can reduce Europe’s vulnerabilities by firmly linking the Western Balkan states, Ukraine, and Moldova to its political and economic orbit, sending the message to rival countries that the EU is expanding and increasing its stability. In this way, enlargement turns from a distant promise into an immediate instrument of shared resilience.

In the end, the idea of the “Independence Moment” that von der Leyen speaks of is tested every day: from hybrid campaigns in the Western Balkans to drones over Poland and Ukraine.

The choice is clear. Europe can continue with the current gradualist approach and leave gray zones exposed — or it can act decisively, integrating the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and Moldova as part of its strategic and security perimeter.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Celik Rruplli, Media analyst with experience in the Albanian and EU media spectrum.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation or the organizations the authors work for.