13.06.2024

Who Will Lead Europe? – Ditmir Bushati, June 2024

Elections for the European Parliament are always accompanied by the question of who will lead Europe. However, they are essentially 27 parallel elections, as each country decides on its own method for electing representatives to Strasbourg. Historically, European elections have been considered second-tier votes, yet they often impact domestic politics—as shown in France, where President Macron called for early parliamentary elections. These elections are becoming increasingly political, driven by domestic agendas rather than a cohesive vision for Europe, making the analysis of results a complex process.

The Pendulum Swings Right

The political pendulum has clearly shifted to the right. The political weight of center-right and far-right forces has grown. Nevertheless, the contraction of centrist parties is minor—falling from 59% to 56% of the seats in the European Parliament compared to the previous elections.

The European People’s Party (EPP) not only maintained its position as the leading force—continuing a tradition established since 1999—but also gained strength. The EPP grew in both numbers and influence in most EU member states, solidifying its status as an indispensable actor in forming the EU’s new institutions.

The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats came second but continues to bleed votes. The Liberals suffered a significant reduction due to President Macron’s party’s heavy defeat in France. Still, these main political groups are expected to hold a leading majority in the European Parliament.

While the 2019 elections were marked by the Greens’ triumph, pushing the EU toward adopting the Green Agenda, this time the Greens have seen significant losses, now ranking as the second-smallest group in the European Parliament. Notably, among the three key reports requested by the EU in anticipation of institutional renewal—(i) on defense preparedness by former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö; (ii) on the internal market by former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta; and (iii) on competitiveness by Mario Draghi—the environment is absent. It’s clear that Europe is shifting away from prioritizing the objectives of the Green Agenda.

The “Sanitary Cordon” Snaps

The far-right gained ground. The group of Conservatives and Reformists grew, largely due to the success of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s party, as well as similar parties in Poland, Spain, and Sweden. Further right, the Identity and Democracy group also made gains, fueled by the results of Marine Le Pen’s party in France and the Freedom Party in Austria. Their growth would have been even more significant had they not expelled Germany’s Alternative for Germany party a few weeks ago—a party that relegated Chancellor Scholz’s Social Democrats to third place.

Importantly, far-right parties made breakthroughs in countries where they have never governed before, mainly France and Germany. In contrast, in countries that have suffered from populist rule, traditional parties performed well. While every EU election has raised the idea of a “sanitary cordon” against far-right parties, it must be acknowledged that none of these parties now use violent rhetoric. Even Ursula von der Leyen, during the Maastricht debate among European Commission presidential candidates, broke with the concept of a “sanitary cordon,” leaving open the possibility of cooperation with these groups—provided they respect the EU’s values, rule of law, and its stance on Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.

If we combine the far-right groupings and add Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán’s party, they would rank second in the European Parliament after the EPP, pushing the Socialists and Democrats into third place. The potential for collaboration exists, albeit with difficulty. While the far-right conglomerate agrees on fighting the “Brussels elite from within,” they remain deeply divided on foreign policy—especially regarding Russia.

The Unknowns of the New Political Leadership

The first challenge following the constitution of the European Parliament is the division of key EU leadership positions. The Socialists and Democrats have mandated German Chancellor Scholz and Spanish Prime Minister Sánchez, while the EPP is expected to appoint Polish Prime Minister Tusk and Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis to find an acceptable solution for leadership allocations.

Over time, the EU’s ability to translate election results into institutional leadership has become more difficult. It used to be easy to identify who might lead the European Commission, Parliament, or institutions like the European Central Bank. Now it is far more complicated—as seen in 2019, when EU leaders took weeks to appoint the Commission President. This time, the process may take even longer, partly due to France’s snap elections, called by President Macron.

The current coalition format—EPP, Socialists and Democrats, and Liberals—supporting the European Commission might also include the Greens, though their negotiating power has diminished after poor election results. Alternatively, “flexible parliamentary majorities” could emerge, thanks to potential cooperation between the EPP and Conservatives and Reformists. Though traditional parties have ruled out collaboration with this group, Giorgia Meloni—as its symbolic leader and Prime Minister of the EU’s third-largest country—is expected to play a pivotal role in shaping the EU institutions, especially with France and Germany’s leaders both suffering electoral defeats.

The 100 Unaffiliated MEPs

Another wildcard is the 100 Members of the European Parliament not affiliated with any existing political groups—a relatively high number compared to the previous legislature. Past experience shows this group cannot be treated as a monolith. Still, every political group will try to negotiate with them to expand their ranks, as group affiliation offers undeniable advantages in parliamentary leadership and influence.

A Stricter, Less Green EU

For the next five years, the rightward tilt of the European Parliament is likely to result in stricter EU policies on migration. The EU’s current approach to migration has been shaped by the right for over a decade. The idea of securing borders and extending Europe’s security by funding neighboring countries (Turkey, Libya, Tunisia) is rooted in right-wing politics. This trend is set to intensify due to the latest election results.

Likewise, the EU is expected to adopt a more “brown” than green agenda—focusing on defense-related industrial policies. Europe may revise its entire set of industrial priorities. However, a distinction must be made between prioritizing national defense spending and jointly financing the reorganization of the European economy and collective defense. A far-right-influenced EU may struggle to reach a consensus on funding joint defense efforts.

An EU leaning more toward "sovereignty" and less toward green goals is unlikely to fund a European industrial policy, even if that’s what is needed to boost EU competitiveness in the digital and energy transition—not to mention advancing agricultural reforms necessary to protect the environment and prepare for enlargement with up to 36 countries.

Will Enlargement Move Forward?

EU enlargement may progress if seen as a counterweight to its internal decline or as an opportunity to undertake deep institutional reforms. In other words, a Europe organized into concentric circles—simultaneously expanding and deepening policy integration—could ease decision-making. However, an EU with nationalist shades or, worse, illiberal representation in key positions will lack the political will and credibility to talk about rule of law—whether with candidate countries or on the international stage.

US Elections and Europe’s Future

European elections ended without answering the question: who will lead Europe? Perhaps the U.S. presidential elections will be more decisive for Europe’s future than the European Parliament vote. This is due to internal divisions within Europe. The dividing line in the EU is not necessarily between left and right, or north and south—but between countries seeking greater European sovereignty and those that never believed in it.

In this context, the outcome of the U.S. presidential election will, one way or another, influence the EU’s course regarding European integration, Europe’s security architecture—still reeling from Russia’s aggression in Ukraine—and cooperation with NATO.

 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ditmir Bushati is a former Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs and a former Member of the Albanian Parliament.

 

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation or the organizations the authors work for.

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